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PRIVATIZING TRADEMARKS
Irina D. Manta*

While trademarkspromote a competitive andproductive marketplace, the Patent
and Trademark Office runs the current system of trademark registration as a
monopoly of questionable productivity. Delays in obtaining trademark
registrations result in a risk to applicants of investing substantial sums into
ultimately unregisterable marks. This Article proposes a system of privatized
trademark registration as a solution, with features including: multiple entities
serving as registrars; an optional expedited process; and quality-control
mechanisms. To explore the viability of trademarkprivatization, the Article relies
on the theoretical privatization literature and practical examples in which
government exclusivity has been removed from intellectual-property (and other)
decision-making.By challenging the PTO's monopoly, the Article pursues a more
general discussion about improvements to the existing system of trademark
registration.
INTRODUCTION
Trademark law is guided by market-oriented principles that encourage
productivity and successful sale of goods--or so the story goes. It is true that at
their root, trademarks are commercial instruments that designate goods and their
origins effectively, thus promoting competition in the market. The way the United
*
Assistant Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I owe
many thanks to Daniel Abebe, David Abrams, Judge Morris S. Arnold, Douglas Baird,
Shyam Balganesh, Will Baude, Graeme Dinwoodie, Richard Epstein, Lee Fennell, Michele
Goodwin, Justin Hughes, Scott Kieff, Jacqueline Lipton, Clarisa Long, Jacob Loshin,
Spyros Maniatis, Tom Miles, Jonathan Mitchell, Jonathan Nash, Jeremy Phillips, Randy
Picker, Ariel Porat, Arden Rowell, Jamelle Sharpe, Geoffrey Stone, Lior Strahilevitz,
Rebecca Tushnet, Eugene Volokh, Robert Wagner. I am grateful to the participants of the
2008 Intellectual Property Roundtable at Drake Law School, and in particular David
Fagundes, Steven Hetcher, Kali Murray, Sharon Sandeen, and Peter Yu. I further appreciate
the input from participants at the 2008 Law and Society Conference in Montreal, Canada,
and 2008 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at Stanford Law School, and especially
Jonathan Barnett, Laura Bradford, Eric Goldman, Mark Lemley, Lisa Ramsey, and David
Welkowitz. Additionally, I am grateful to the participants at the University of Chicago Law
School Work In Progress series. I would also like to thank my research assistant Frank
"Chip" Dickerson. Finally, my appreciation goes to the employees of the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office and librarians at the University of Chicago Law School who answered
questions during my research.
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States runs its system of trademark registration,however, is both ineffective and
antithetical to principles of competition. This Article uncovers a number of flaws
in the current system and proposes the idea of a privatized system of trademark
registration. If implemented correctly, this model would likely decrease both fees
and wait times associated with obtaining trademarks, while providing high-quality
registrations and respecting society's public policy preferences for the substantive
content of marks.1
As Frank Schechter pointed out in his seminal article The Rational Basis
of TrademarkProtection, "[tihe true functions of the trademark are.., to identify
a product as satisfactory and thereby to stimulate further purchases by the
consuming public." 2 Throughout his 1927 article, Schechter emphasized how
preserving the selling power of the mark is the key consideration in designing a
trademark system.3 Some have gone further in explaining why trademarks are so
important to both producers and consumers and have stated that without proper
identification of goods, "[t]here could be no pride of workmanship, no credit for
good quality, no responsibility for bad." 4
In this understanding, trademark law offers a form of commercial
regulation like any other. Indeed, unlike in the case of copyright and patentswhich are both explicitly mentioned in the U.S. Constitution 5-the federal
government draws its entire authority to run a system of trademark registration
from the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.6 The government performs this
function through the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). The PTO handles
all matters related to trademark registration and seeks to ensure that each mark "in
trade enables buyers to distinguish competing goods from each other," which
"makes possible the democratic right of free choice." 7 To do so, it is at times

1.
See discussion about the prohibition on marks that are, for instance,
scandalous, immoral, or disparaging in Part I.B, infra.
2.
Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of TrademarkProtection, 40 HARV.
L. REV. 813, 818 (1927).
3.
Id.
4.
Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks,
14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 175 (1949). Rogers also notes that, but for the existence
of trademarks, products would only have to conform to "minimum government
specifications" and no more. Id. at 180.
5.
U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 8.
6.
Id. § 8, cl. 3; see also Int'l Bancorp, LLC v. Socidtd des Bains de Mer et du
Cercle des Etrangers A Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 363-64 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that
"'commerce' under the [Lanham] Act is coterminous with that commerce that Congress
may regulate under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution").
7.
Rogers, supra note 4, at 177; see also Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical
Development of Trademarks, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 222, 247 (1983)

(arguing that

"[t]rademarks are essential to the operation of a competitive system of free enterprise"
because they provide the "only feasible means by which the consumer can select the
particular variety of product that he wishes to buy from among the multitude of choices that
manufacturers now make available to satisfy individual tastes and individual preferences
among the purchasing public"); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:1 (4th ed. 1996) (explaining that in addition to protecting
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necessary for the PTO to award trademarks in a way that "cede[s] control of
distinct product markets to individual producers and thereby lead[s] to
monopoly." 8 It is understood, however, that the creation of such monopolies
should only serve as an instrumental device in the grander scheme of maintaining a
thriving competitive market. As one scholar writes, when developing trademark
law, "[t]he proper task was, therefore, one of crafting a trademark regime that
appropriately balanced the competitive interests at stake by providing protection
9
that minimized material deception without discouraging competitive entry."
Juxtaposed with this concern for protecting competitive forces in society,
it appears paradoxical that the government runs the trademark registration system
in a monopolistic, noncompetitive, and, as a result, often wasteful manner. An
individual who chooses to apply for a federally valid trademark can only direct her
request to the PTO and no other entity. The applicant has to pay the PTO's set
application fee and sometimes incur additional fees after applying.") After
conforming to a set of such requirements, more serious difficulties set in: the
average time between when a person files a trademark application and when the
PTO registers the mark is an unfortunately lengthy 13.9 months.11
This period is one of uncertainty for a trademark applicant. He can choose
to launch his product or service with an unregistered mark, but doing so could
mean losing any investments in advertising and marketing associated with a
potential registration refusal and a subsequent change in marks. 12 Or, he could wait
consumers and producers, trademark law seeks to "encourag[e] competition from which the
public benefits").
8.

Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 370

(1999).
9.
Id. at 370-71. Lunney believes that this balance began to be destabilized in
the 1950s and that trademark protection became too favorable to trademark owners. Id. at
371-73. But see Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82

L. REV. 1839, 1840-41 (challenging traditional notions of trademark law
history and arguing that the goal of the law was always to primarily protect producers rather
than consumers).
10.
An application for trademark registration costs between $275 and $375 per
trademark, per international class, plus possible additional fees. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, Fees - FY 2009 Fee Schedule, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/
fee2009january01 _2009jan 12.htm#tm.
NOTRE DAME

11.
U.S.
ACCOUNTABILITY

PATENT
REPORT,

&

TRADEMARK

OFFICE,

PTO

PERFORMANCE

AND

Fiscal
Year
2008
20-23,
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/corn/annual/2008/2008annualreport.pdf.
The
PTO
emphasizes how this is an improved performance and enumerates the ways in which the
process has been enhanced. Id.
12.
One might object that the applicant can often continue to use the mark and
rely on common law rights rather than the benefits of federal registration. Many parties are,
however, not willing or able to use an unregistered mark. This was illustrated in recent years
by the amount of money and efforts that the Washington Redskins football team invested in
keeping its trademarked name when the trademark was challenged for being scandalous and
disparaging by Native American activists. For a brief summary of the history of the
litigation, see Eric M. Weiss, Indians Fight Redskins Name, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2006),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.coml/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/1 1/
AR2006081101045dpf.html.
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until registration has succeeded before using the mark, but this decision could
entail financial losses as well from foregoing possible business opportunities. He
thus finds himself at an impasse. Further, because no organization clearly
represents in the political arena the interests of trademark applicants-a scattered
group that spans many demographics-his predicament is difficult for him to
change any time soon. 3 Researchers and policymakers may thus be better
equipped to study the matter and act on it, and experts in various countries have
indeed started calling for reforms such as the introduction of a fast-track system. 14
Federal registration is highly relevant to the proper functioning of
trademark law because of the many benefits that it confers onto a mark owner. One
of the key advantages of registration is that it Provides nationwide constructive
notice of use and ownership of specific marks. This means that the trademark
owner obtains exclusive rights to the mark across the country, including regions
where the registrant does not plan to expand. Individuals who infringe upon16
federally registered marks cannot plead a defense of ignorance or good faith.
Owners of registered marks can further prevent other applicants from registering
marks that are confusingly similar to the original owners. ' 17 Federal registration
constitutes "prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the
registration of the mark" and "of the registrant's ownership of the mark. 1 8 The
registration procedure also enables a mark to become incontestable five years after
registration (which means that a mark can only be challenged for a very limited set
of reasons from then on), 19 permits a mark owner to rely on the assistance of
customs officials to prevent importation of infringing marks,2 ° and increases the
number of legal remedies available to an owner.2' The existence of these features
thus protects the interests of registered trademark owners in a variety of settings
and allows them a greater degree of reliance in their marks.22 It explains why many
companies and individuals need the PTO to confirm quickly if they can register
particular marks; in the vast majority of cases, these trademark owners would

13.
See discussion infra Part II.
14.
See discussion infra notes 172-174 and accompanying text.
15.
15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2006).
16.
This is not to imply that such defenses will necessarily or even normally
prove successful in litigation involving unregistered marks. I thank Graeme Dinwoodie for
his comments on this point.
17.
Id.§ 1114.
18.
Id. § 1115(a).
19.
Id.§ 1065.
20.
Id.§ 1124.
21.
Id.§§ 1116-1120. For a discussion of the benefits of federal registration, see
also Todd Anten, Note, Self-Disparaging Trademarks and Social Change: Factoring the
Reappropriationof Slurs into Section 2(A) of the Lanham Act, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 388,
396-98 (2006).
22.
But see Robert Burrell, Trade Mark Bureaucracies,in TRADEMARK LAW AND
THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH, Chapter 4 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie &

Mark D.
Janis
eds.,
2008),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid= 1027504 (providing a critique of trademark registration systems).
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much rather have to pick a new mark-within a reasonable period of time-than
undertake the vagaries of maintaining an unregistered mark.23
If one asks the PTO why the trademark registration process is plagued by
delays, it answers that the sheer bulk of applications is so large that delays are
inevitable. 24 In 2008, more than 400,000 trademark registration applications were
filed; 25 during the same year, 398 PTO-employed attorneys served as trademark
examiners.26 Some numbers suggest that patent examiners are able to spend no
more than an average of eighteen hours on each application, which some scholars
believe to contribute to the fact that courts hold 46% of litigated patents to be
invalid; 27 meanwhile, the figure of average time spent per application is
undoubtedly significantly lower in the trademark context. 28 Although the PTO has
taken some measures to increase the effectiveness of the trademark application
process, such as by transitioning to an ever-increasing percentage of electronic

23.

It may appear at first that so-called intent-to-use applications (also known as

ITU applications) solve part of this problem because they allow individuals to temporarily
register marks based on only good-faith intent of use rather than actual use of the mark in
commerce. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1) (2006). This gives applicants the opportunity to
reserve a mark while developing it commercially. At the same time, ITU applications also
have to go through the same type of examination as regular applications (with the main
difference being that use is, of course, not yet required in the first stage of the ITU
application but rather is examined later). Thus, while ITU applications allow mark holders
to establish priority in the case of disputes, the review process is equally time-intensive and
thus the problems associated with delays remain.
24.
This is the explanation that I received during phone calls with PTO
employees.
25.
U.S. PATENT &TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 11, at 129.
26.
Id. at 10-13.
27.
Mark A. Lemley, RationalIgnorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv.
1495, 1500 (2001) (internal citation omitted).
28.
Of course, less time is necessary to determine the validity of a trademark, but
it is possible, judging from the patent context, that the PTO's trademark examination
process contains many imperfections of its own. That being said, the extent of the problems
with trademark quality is certainly no match to the issues surrounding patent quality. See
William M. Landes, An Empirical Analysis of Intellectual Property Litigation: Some
PreliminaryResults, 41 Hous. L. REV. 749, 756 (2004) (surmising that the absence of data
about how many trademarks are struck down as invalid suggests that the problem is small
compared to the patent situation).
An extremely rough estimate of how many hours are spent on the average trademark
application would go something like this: about 400,000 applications are filed each year,
and about 400 examining attorneys work on them. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
supra note 11. If each attorney works about 2000 hours a year, this would mean a total of
800,000 work hours spent examining applications. The PTO probably disposes of about
400,000 applications a year (a part filed the same year and a part earlier). This would lead to
a figure of about two hours per application. Because this calculation is so rough, it could be
that the number is double or triple that figure, so four or six hours. In any case, (1) it
appears doubtful that examiners spend a significant number of hours on each application,
and (2) these low figures make the necessity of the existing delays even more questionable.
I would like to thank Eric Goldman for our discussion on this subject.
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* 29
rather than paper-based applications,
many problems remain. Some may suggest
that we simply need to hire more examiners to correct these issues.

This Article hypothesizes, however, that we need to dig deeper than that
to truly make the process more efficient.30 Rejecting entrenched notions about the
traditionally purely governmental nature of the PTO, this piece engages in a
thought experiment and asks if we perhaps ought to return to the root of trademark
theory-i.e., that trademarks serve to regulate commerce and should seek to
improve competition-and construct a trademark registration system based on the
same principles and more strongly guided by concerns about economic waste. This
analysis results in a proposal to replace the PTO's trademark registration
procedures through a competitive market in which private actors would act as
trademark registrars, with built-in safeguard mechanisms to protect the function
and legitimacy of the process. 3 1 In discussing the proposal, the Article also raises
questions both directly and indirectly about different levels of examination, the
weights and presumptions we should attach to them, and a number of other
recurring issues in trademark law and policy.
The United States has traditionally used privatization to enhance the
country's ability to supply goods and services as diverse as utilities, transit system
operation, trash removal and recycling, medical services, industrial services, and
many more.32 Nonetheless, the United States has maintained the centralized nature
29.
Id.
30.
Mark Lemley suggests that in the patent context, doubling the number of
hours spent per application would involve a 50% increase in the cost of patent prosecutions.
Lemley, supra note 27, at 1508. Further, many examples have shown that hiring additional
staff in government services does not actually necessarily improve service quality. For
instance, New York City increased the number of police officers from 16,000 to 24,000
over a twenty-five year period, and yet the total numbers of hours worked by the entire
police force decreased. E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 34
(2000). "The entire 50 percent increase in personnel was devoted to shortening the
workweek, lengthening the lunch hour and vacation period, and providing more holidays
and paid sick leave." Id.
31.
In his work, Lawrence Lessig briefly suggests the idea of using private
registrars in the copyright context. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA
USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE, 289-90 (2004); see infra note
227 and accompanying text.
32.
SAVAS, supra note 30, at 72-73; see also PRIVATIZATION: THE PROVISION OF
PUBLIC SERVICES BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR (Roger L. Kemp ed., 1991) (discussing several
examples of privatization). It should be noted that for many goods and services that were
successfully privatized, many critics spoke out against privatization before the fact and
believed that the government was a necessary component whose absence would be sorely
felt. Perhaps the most famous instance of what was considered a good that could not be
privatized is Ronald Coase's lighthouse example. See R. H. Coase, The Lighthouse in
Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974). It is understood that the history of lighthouses was
more multifaceted than Coase suggests and that special cooperation existed between the
government and lighthouse operators. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, The Libertarian Quartet,
REASON MAGAZINE, Jan. 1999 (reviewing RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY:
JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (1998)), available at http://www.reason.com/news/show/
30841.html (describing the special role of lighthouses at the intersection of private and

public forces); Andrew Odlyzko, The Evolution of Price Discrimination in Transportation
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of essential government functions like administration of the law. The introduction
of the decentralized, privatized provision of internet domain-name registration and
related dispute resolution has, however, challenged these notions to some extent.
This Article's proposal pushes the boundaries of privatization a step further in that
direction and seeks to replace the current administrative process of registering
marks with a market-oriented mechanism. It remains mindful, however, of the
pitfalls of the internet privatization experience and hopes to provide a more
nuanced course of action that maximizes productivity while promoting procedural
fairness.
To pursue the project of providing a privatized model, this Article first
analyzes the function and use of trademarks in commerce. This examination yields
the need for a registration system that reliably allows trademarks to fulfill their
function as providers of information in contexts such as source identification,
quality, and advertising. The discussion shows that the main goal of trademarks in
all these areas is to provide effective markets, and it raises the question whether
systems other than the PTO might better track that goal. Then, the argument
explores the findings of the existing privatization literature to identify processes
that could enhance the functioning of the trademark registration system; the closest
attention is given to some of the areas of privatization that relate the most directly
to trademarks, namely the use of private certification marks, the current system of
internet domain names, and the peer-to-patent model. This Article goes on to
propose a model that uses private entities where appropriate to decrease processing
time and costs while maintaining or increasing the quality of trademark
registrations. The model balances the introduction of private actors with
governmental protections that would help to ensure economic gains as well as
provide a forum for the public to continue exercising its values and judgments into
the noncommercial aspects of the trademark registration process.
The resulting model proposes the use of private entities as competing
registrars that would process trademark applications and enter registrations into a
common, national database. These entities may offer their services for different
fees, allowing for more expensive expedited processes as well as slower, cheaper
registrations. Both formal and informal mechanisms would provide potential
customers with information as to the quality of each entity, and the government
would regulate both entry into this market and who could remain in it. The
government would set a number of conditions for the necessary start-up capital and
expertise on the part of registrars. It would also conduct random checks to ensure
high-quality registration as well as shut down any entities that fail the checks or
whose marks are struck down in litigation with high frequency. The government
could further impose penalties on registrars who fail to fulfill their obligations to
apply the conditions of the Lanham Act when accepting marks for registration.
The private registrars would also use an eBay-style feedback mechanism
where applicants could leave comments and ratings both immediately after
registration and periodically after a number of years, for instance when renewing
and Its Implications for the Internet, 3 REv. NETWORK ECON. 323, 341-42 (2004)

(explaining the complex status of lighthouses). The model proposed here is also one of
cooperation between the government and private entities.
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registrations. This would give registrars the incentive to provide speedy and
professional services while also maintaining high registration quality; after all,
marks that are struck down in litigation due to their infringing character would
result in poor ratings and thus fewer customers down the line. In a similar vein,
registrars could provide liability insurance (such as the type one can observe in the
land-title search context) that would partially or entirely reimburse applicants for
damages suffered due to problematic registrations. This combination of
governmental and private quality-enforcement mechanisms would keep any
reckless behavior on the part of registrars to a minimum and allow trademark
applicants to reap the full benefits of a privatized system. After presenting the
model, this Article demonstrates how the same principles used to analyze
trademark registration may shed light on other areas of administrative regulation
that could benefit from targeted reforms through privatization.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the function of
trademarks and their use in commerce. Part II provides a background on
privatization theory and its successes, failures, and lessons; as mentioned, it also
gives examples of privatization in areas related to trademark registration. In Part
III, the piece describes a new model for a partially privatized trademark
registration system based on the insights of Parts I and II. Part III also addresses
objections to the model and briefly discusses further areas of government
regulation where a similar model could be applied.

I. TRADEMARKS IN COMMERCE
A. Background
As scholars have often remarked, "[t]rademarks have existed for almost
as long as trade itself, 33 Some believe that marks were already used on stone-age
pottery thousands of years ago. 34 Others think that marking began with the
branding of animals such as cattle.35 As trade between countries expanded over
time, so did the need for marks: manufacturers wanted to provide sourceidentification information to remote customers who could then make repeat orders

33.
ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER SETH MENELL & MARK
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 529 (3d ed. 2003).

A.

LEMLEY,

34.
Gerald Ruston, On the Origin of Trademarks, 45 TRADEMARK REP. 127, 128
(1955). Throughout the article Ruston also provides pictorial examples of what ancient
marks looked like. See, e.g., id at 129.
35.
Diamond, supra note 7, at 223. There is a rich tradition of cattle branding in
the United States due to the historical importance of the cattle industry in the West. See,
e.g., THEODORE ELHARD, N.D. DEP'T OF AGRIC., HISTORY AND LAWS PERTAINING TO
LIVESTOCK BRANDS (1966) (describing the history of branding in North Dakota); JOE NUNN,
HISTORY OF BRANDS AND BRANDING IN SIOuX COUNTY (1978) (recounting branding history
for Sioux County, Nebraska); GERALD A. SMITH, CATTLE BRANDS OF SAN BERNARDINO

COUNTY (1974) (discussing the history of branding in San Bernardino County, California);
J. J. Wagoner, A History of Cattle Branding in Arizona, 27 N.M. HIST. REv. 187 (1952)
(providing background on branding history in Arizona).
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if they enjoyed the quality of certain goods; thus, 36
these early marks performed
similar functions in commerce to today's trademarks.
One scholar describes trademarks as mainly serving three purposes in
commerce over time and to this day. 37 First is the identification function, which
allows customers to distinguish amongst similar goods from different
manufacturers.3 s The mark "bridges the gap between the consumer and the
manufacturer, a gap that tends to grow wider as production units increase in size,
distribution extends to more distant markets, and self-service retailing takes the
consumer even farther away from the source of supply." 39 The second function is
the guarantee function through which consumers begin to view particular marks as
symbols of quality. 40 While a certain mark may not guarantee quality per se, it
does tend to guarantee consistency. 41 The third function is the advertising function,
because trademarks serve both as symbols that can be employed in advertising2 and
"the package that bears the trademark becomes an advertising medium itself."
Although marks initially mostly served the identification and guarantee
functions, there has been a "shift from viewing a trademark as a source of
information about a product, to viewing the trademark as a product. ' 3 The
goodwill of a business, instantiated by its trademark, is often more valuable than
all its other assets combined. 44 In 1988, for example, Kraft, which owns
trademarks such as Kraft cheese, Miracle Whip, and Breyers ice cream, was
purchased for a total of $12.9 billion, a sum worth four times Kraft's tangible

36.

Diamond, supra note 7, at 227.

37.

Id.at 246.

38.
Id. Numerous scholars have mentioned or discussed the identifying function
of trademarks. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 721,
725 (2004); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness of

Product Design Trade Dress, 75 N.C. L. REv. 471, 477 n.18 (1997); Peter Lee, The
Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REv. 39, 58 (2008); Mark A. Lemley,
The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1695

(1999).
39.
40.

Diamond, supra note 7, at 246.
Id.; see also Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78

523, 527 (1988) (emphasizing the importance of the role of trademarks as
identifying a quality standard by the start of the twentieth century).
TRADEMARK REP.

41.
Diamond, supra note 7, at 246; see also William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, TrademarkLaw: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & EcoN. 265, 270 (1987) ("[A]

firm has an incentive to develop a trademark only if it is able to maintain consistent
quality."). Customers do, however, often associate marks with quality and not just
consistency expectations. As early as medieval times, for instance, marks were used by each
bladesmith as a mandatory matter and had to be registered in his guild-halls so that
defective work could be traced back to the individual who manufactured it. Thomas D.
Drescher, The Transformation and Evolution of Trademarks-FromSignals to Symbols to

Myth, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 301, 314 (1992). A bladesmith could be fined and even expelled
from the profession if that occurred. Id.at 314-15.
42.
Diamond, supra note 7, at 247.
43.
Lunney, supra note 8, at 371.
44.

Edward S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trade-Marks, 62

TRADEMARK REP.

239, 254 (1972).
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assets.45 Similarly, the impressive growth of Starbucks's revenues from $975
million to over $2.6 billion in only four years has been attributed to the company's
strong brand name.46 A 2008 report ranking the most powerful brand names lists
values between $6 billion and $86 billion for each of one hundred brands. 7
Another report currently values the Wal-Mart brand at $129 billion.48 Trademarks
are therefore obviously extremely valuable assets in their own right.49
The evolution of trademark law toward greater protection for trademark
owners has welcomed and encouraged this development.50 One scholar explains
that "the need for incentives that trademark law addresses becomes not just a
question of minimizing consumer deception to ensure a market that generates
accurate pricing signals, but a matter of rewarding and thereby encouraging
investment in the marks themselves." 51 With this knowledge in mind, it is useful to
turn now toward the relevant statutory law and the litigation that surrounds it.
B. Commerce and the Lanham Act
In 1946, Congress enacted the Lanham Act, which governs modem
federal trademark law, with the goal "to protect the public from deceit, to foster
fair competition, and to secure to the business community the advantages of
reputation and goodwill by preventing their diversion from those who have created
them to those who have not., 52 The focus is thus strongly on ensuring the proper
treatment of marks in commerce. Indeed, to obtain a trademark registration in the
first place, an applicant must show that the mark 5has
been used in commerce or
3
that he has a bona fide intent to use it in commerce.
The norm is that any word, symbol, or other device can be used as a
mark, with designated exceptions. 54 While some of these exceptions-such as the
one against permitting scandalous, offensive, or immoral marks 55 -are based on
noncommercial public policy considerations, the provisions most often involved in
45.

Drescher, supra note 41, at 302.

46.

Joshua Kennon, Starbucks Franchise Value-A Case Study of an Excellent

Business, ABOUT.COM, Jan. 17, 2005, http://beginnersinvest.about.com/cs/newinvestors
/a/021103a.htm. Some experts currently value the Starbucks brand at $12 billion. Millward
Brown Optimor, Top 100 Most Powerful Brands 08 (2008), at
11,
http://www.millwardbrown.com/Sites/Optimor/Media/Pdfs/en/BrandZ/BrandZ-2008Report.pdf.
47.
Id. at 10-12.
48.
Interbrand Design Forum, The Most Valuable US. Retail Brands 2009, at 2,

http://www.interbrand.com/images/studies/IBDF-MostValuableRetailBrands-FINAL.pdf.
49.
For further discussion of the importance of commercialization in trademarks,

see F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and PropertyRules for CommercializingInventions, 85
MINN. L. REV. 697, 751-53 (2001).
50.
Lunney, supra note 8, at 371-72.
51.
Id.

52.

S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 4 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274,

53.
54.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1051(a)(3)(C), (b)(1) (2006).
Id. § 1052.

55.

Id. § 1052(a).

1277.
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litigation again seek to protect competitive markets first and foremost. The key
Lanham Act provision in this context, § 1052(d), provides that no mark may be
registered that is "likely . . .to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive.' 56 The importance of this portion of the Act becomes obvious upon
learning that virtually all trademark disputes are between companies that use
conflicting marks.57 The fight over marks, both at the registration and later the
litigation stages, thus involves a determination by legal experts (trademark
examining attorneys, judges, etc.) as to what constitutes a proper, noninfringing
mark that comports with all provisions of the Lanham Act.
A failure on the part of such experts to make a timely decision with
regard to a mark's appropriateness prevents a mark from truly fulfilling functions
such as providing identification, guarantee, and advertising. 58 Until registration is
secured, for instance, uncertainty weakens the usefulness of the mark. It is
dangerous for someone to invest in a mark that may need to be changed a year or
two later, when the PTO has finally completed its review of the trademark
application. All three functions of identification, guarantee, and advertising are
disrupted when a registrant has to change a mark. Consumers may be confused and
have to be educated about name changes. The longer a mark is in use, the more
expensive a name change is likely to be. 59 Thus, increased delays in application
processing result in costlier refusals for mark holders.6 °
Furthermore, the faster a mark holder develops a successful product and
trademark, the more she will suffer if the PTO decides not to register her mark. If
she produces high-quality merchandise and thrives in the management of her
brand, people will quickly learn to appreciate her product and seek it out on the
basis of its trademark. It runs contrary to the general spirit of trademark law
(where society seeks to reward manufacturers of popular products for investing in
their marks) to undercut her efforts. Sometimes undercutting is unavoidable; a
manufacturer who carelessly chooses an infringing or generic mark will

56.

Id. § 1052(d).

57.
58.

1 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 2:33.
See supra Part I.A.

59.
This principle is most dramatically illustrated by marks that have been in
force for many years and now face accusations of infringement. In the dispute between the
World Wrestling Federation and the World Wildlife Fund over the initials WWF, it was
estimated that for the former organization to change the name on all its products "could cost
as much as $50-million." Paul Waldie, WWF Knocked Out by Environmentalists,GLOBE &
MAIL (Toronto), May 7, 2002, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines

02/0507-04.htm.

60.
Private search firms can reduce some of the uncertainty that applicants face,
but they cannot fully alleviate the problem for a number of reasons. First, only a small
percentage of applicants can likely afford to hire these attorneys. Second, there is an
inherent softness to trademark law due to questions such as what makes a new mark "too
similar" to an existing one. Private attorneys can provide an educated guess in borderline
cases as to what the PTO will do, but they cannot say for sure. Of course, the counterargument here is that even a PTO determination does not guarantee that a trademark will
hold up in court, but at least the mark will benefit from a presumption of validity in court

that a private search firm cannot provide through its determinations in the current system.
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undoubtedly have to suffer losses due to this decision. Many cases, however, are
ambiguous, and making a good-faith effort to choose a proper mark can still fail.
It bears mentioning that ineffective registrations are often compounded by
ineffective proceedings in later trademark infringement litigation. To name one
example, previous work discussed the uncertainties inherent in the courts' current
treatment of trademark infringement surveys, which have become essential to
virtually any successful infringement litigation. 6 1 Courts have struggled with
nearly every aspect of these surveys, such as what constitutes the proper survey
stimulus with which subjects should be presented, the right form of survey
questions, and what the ideal survey environment should look like. 62 This struggle
leads to wasteful results where a trademark owner can lose her case despite having
a legitimate claim because of the lack of clarity in the judicial system.63 Past
scholarship suggested a number of procedural and substantive changes to enhance
the ability of courts to deal with these surveys, 64 but the issues with trademark
litigation remain manifold. Improving the trademark system on the front end by
potentially increasing registration quality may, however, lower the pressure on the
courts.
It would be to everyone's advantage-the producer, competing producers,
and consumers-to use procedures at the trademark registration stage that
minimize the waste that results from delays and litigation. One solution that has
significantly improved productivity problems and cut down costs in other contexts
has been the complete or partial privatization of government services. Part II
examines both the theoretical framework of privatization and examples of its
practice, with a special emphasis on areas related to trademark registration and
intellectual property.
IT. PRIVATIZATION-THEORY AND PRACTICE
A. The Theory and BackgroundofPrivatization
Various definitions of privatization are used in the scholarly and general
literature. This Article adopts the understanding of privatization as "the use of the
61.

Irina D. Manta, In Search of Validity: A New Model for the Content and

ProceduralTreatment of TrademarkInfringement Surveys, 24 CARDOZO

ARTS

& ENT. L.J.

1027 (2007). Trademark infringement surveys ask consumers to identify attributes of
products such as their source and can provide evidence of likely confusion in the
marketplace. See id. at 1036-37.
62.
Id.; see also Jacob Jacoby, A Critique of Rappeport's "LitigationSurveysSocial 'Science' As Evidence,'" 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1480 (2002); Michael Rappeport,
Litigation Surveys-Social "Science" As Evidence, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 957 (2002). Some

scholarship has particularly focused on the construction of the survey universe, i.e., the
choice of the population that surveys should examine. See, e.g., Robert C. Bird,
Streamlining Consumer Survey Analysis: An Examination of the Concept of Universe in
Consumer Surveys Offered in Intellectual Property Litigation, 88 TRADEMARK REP. 269

(1998); Shashank Upadhye, Trademark Surveys: Identifying the Relevant Universe of
Confused Consumers, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 549 (1998).

63.

Manta, supra note 61, at 1058.

64.

Id.
at 1059-70.
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private sector in the provision of a good or service, the components of which
include financing, operations (supplying, production, delivery), and quality
control., 65 Historically, arguments made in favor of privatization have been varied
and have included pragmatic, economic, ideological, commercial, and populist
influences. 66 Given the close relationship between trademarks and the concept of
effective markets, this Article mainly focuses on the pragmatic influences positing
that reasonable privatization results in more cost-friendly public services. 67 The
idea is that privatization "invokes the power of private property rights, market
forces, and competition to give people more for their money." 68 Of course, the
effectiveness of a particular privatization possibility significantly depends on one's
definition of privatization as well as a great variety of other factors (some of which
this Part discusses), and so it would be overly simplistic for anyone to claim that
privatization "usually works" or "usually fails."
That said, government services are largely run as monopolies, which
leads to an inherent set of drawbacks. Meanwhile, competition within government
is often viewed as "waste and duplication" 69 and does not tend to work well. Two
scholars have noted in their influential work on privatization that "[i]t
is one of the
enduring paradoxes of American ideology that we attack private monopolies so
fervently but embrace public monopolies so warmly., 70 Although democracy is
supposed to provide a check on poor government services despite their monopoly
status, this often does not occur in practice. The scholars do not mince their words
when explaining why that is the case:
Most public agencies don't get their funds from their customers.
Businesses do ....Public agencies get most of their funding from
legislatures, city councils, and elected boards. And most of their
"customers" are captive: short of moving, they have few alternatives
to the services their governments provide. So managers in the public
sector learn to ignore them ....[W]hile businesses strive to please
7
customers, government agencies strive to please interest groups. 1
Note that while trademark applicants technically pay a fee to the PTO,
they cannot choose to take their business elsewhere. They are stuck with whatever
65.
Congressional
66.
67.
68.
69.

Kevin R. Kosar, Privatizationand the Federal Government: An Introduction,
Research Service Report for Congress, 3 (Dec. 28, 2006) (emphasis omitted).
SAVAS, supra note 30, at 6.
Id.
Id.
DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT:

How

THE

79 (1992). The authors
explain: "We assume that each neighborhood should have one school, each city should have
one police force, each region should have one organization driving its buses and operating
its commuter trains." Id.
70.
Id.; see also Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and Regulatory Choice,
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313 (2006) (discussing the effects of framing on popular resistance
to market-based mechanisms in environmental regulation regimes).
71.
OsBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 69, at 167. Public choice theory, which
posits that self-interest drives human behavior, predicts that "in the absence of the profit
motive .. .bureaucrats look after their own interest, not the public interest." GRAEME A.
HODGE, PRIVATIZATION: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE 36 (2000).
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT Is TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR
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economic waste the monopolistic system contains, similarly to the
72 people who deal
with government services for which they do not pay a direct fee.
Many government agencies enjoy monopoly status, and they can take
advantage of their status in several ways. It is extremely difficult to reduce an
agency's budget, and agencies may respond to attempts to do so by presenting a
budget that focuses the cuts on the most salient and popular programs. 73 One
scholar offers the example of the National Parks Service offering to lower its
budget by shutting down a city's most popular tourist attraction, also known as the
"Washington Monument strategy." 74 Another practice that flows from the
monopoly status is the use of "tie-in sales" that force customers to pay for an
unwanted service if they wish to obtain a wanted one; one such case is when the
city of Plaquemine, Louisiana, attempted to force its water customers to also buy
city power.75
Another reason that democracy does not always keep government service
in check is because the majority of Americans may not make use of a service on
any regular basis. In the case of the PTO, most Americans will never file a
trademark application, which is why the problems with the process remain
unknown to the general population. It is often difficult for a minority to combat
problems with the PTO because: (1) many trademark applicants do not possess the
funds or time to put up a fight; (2) these applicants do not represent any one
organized group; and (3) it is unclear whether such resistance will make a
noticeable difference. Between these and other factors, the incentives are low for
individual trademark applicants to combat the entire current system.
Even if elements within a governmental service seek to adapt the
organization to better serve the public, a number of obstacles stand in the way.
Some believe that there are three key problems: the political environment that
surrounds government organizations; the organizational culture from which the
management and employees of the governmental agencies suffer; and the types of
personnel and procurement policies that impair the organization's ability to

72.
Of course, while there is no direct fee, individuals often still pay for these
services through taxation.
73.
SAVAS, supra note 30, at 31.
74.
Id. The Washington Monument strategy refers to the following:
When budget times are tough in Washington, D.C., government agencies
are asked what they can do to trim spending. In an effort to preserve their
existing spending levels, they threaten to close the Washington
Monument. They believe that if they can cause enough public outrage
they can protect their department from cuts or get lawmakers to raise
taxes.
Sam Blakeslee, Washington Monument Strategy Alive and Well in California,
FLASHREPORT,
Jan.
17,
2008,
http://www.flashreport.org/featured-columnslibrary0b.php?falD=2008011701415955.

75.
SAVAS, supra note 30, at 31-32. Savas notes that every once in a while, this
tactic may actually run into antitrust concerns. Id.
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complete its work.76 One of the goals of privatization is to allow entities to
perform the same services while minimizing these kinds of problems.
The idea of privatization is far from new. As early as 1789, for example,
Congress enacted a statute that provided for the contracting out of a project to
build a lighthouse near the Chesapeake Bay and maintain lighthouses, public piers,
and other such facilities across states.77 The privatization movement really took off
in the United States and Great Britain in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 78 Great
Britain denationalized a series of major state-owned companies (the United States
pursued less privatization by sale, in part because it did not have as many such
organizations to begin with). 79 Many other countries-Western and developing
80
countries in the 1980s, then the former Soviet block in the 1990s-followed suit.
"By the mid-1990s privatization of state and local services in the United States
was universal, having penetrated even large cities with strong public-employee
unions, and it had become a policy of the federal government."'" All U.S.
presidents starting with Ronald Reagan have, to varying degrees, shown support
for the idea of privatization.8 2 This has been the case on both sides of the political
aisle-for example, the Clinton Administration endorsed thirty-six alternatives to
"standard delivery service" as part of its "Reinventing Government" initiative.83
Because of the complexity of the subject, there is no single answer as to
whether privatization is a good idea in a given situation. The trend amongst
empirical studies, however, tends to show that privatization reduces waste more
often than not across a variety of industries. One summary of studies conducted
from the 1960s through the 1980s that examined areas such as electric utilities,
refuse, water, health-related services, and others shows that a majority of studies
found that private companies were more productive than state-owned companies
while only few found state-owned companies to be more productive. 4 The
summary authors' own study of the 500 largest international manufacturing and
76.
JEFFREY A. Roy, AN APPROACH TO PRIVATIZATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY
13-14 (2003).
77.
Kosar, supra note 65, at 2.
78.
SAvAS, supra note 30, at 15. For a history of the practice of contracting out
government services in the United States, see Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose and Private
Service: The Twentieth Century Culture of Contracting Out and the Evolving Law of
Diffused Sovereignty, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 859 (2000).
79.
SAVAS,supra note 30, at 15. Some examples of companies that Great Britain
privatized were British Petroleum, British Aerospace, Britoil, National Freight Corporation,
British Telecom, British Gas, British Airways, Jaguar, and Rolls Royce. Id.
80.
Id. at 16.
81.
Id. at 16-17 (footnote omitted).
82.
Kosar, supra note 65, at 9. It is too early to tell at this stage whether this
trend will continue during the Obama Administration.
83.
Guttman, supra note 78, at 861. The initiative was named after David
Osborne and Ted Gaebler's book by the same name. See OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note
69.
84.
Anthony E. Boardman & Aidan R. Vining, Ownership and Performance in
Competitive Environments:A Comparison of the Performance of Private,Mixed, and StateOwned Enterprises, in 2 PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 353 (Vincent Wright & Luisa
Perrotti eds., 2000).
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mining corporations outside the United States also concluded (after controlling for
the regulatory/competitive environment in which each corporation operated) that
large state-owned enterprises were less productive than equivalent private
corporations.8 5 Similarly, in another international study, three scholars found
"significant increases in profitability, output per employee (adjusted for inflation),
capital spending, and total employment" associated with privatization.16 While
certainly not every study on privatization has found increased productivity in
private corporations,8 7 the average effects of privatization have been positive.
Privatization experts have extensively described the arguments that favor
contracting government work out to private actors. Contracting can be more
effective than government services because it: (1) "harnesses competitive forces
and brings the pressure of the marketplace to bear on inefficient products;" (2)
facilitates higher-quality management less encumbered by political constraints;
and (3) aligns management's goals with customers' through the use of
performance-based incentives.8 8 Further, contractors are often better able to
provide the public with fast and flexible responses to new needs and are more
likely to innovate when doing so.89 Of course, contracting can also prove
problematic if issues arise such as a lack of qualified suppliers and, thus,
insufficient competition or a loss of quality in the provision of services. 90 Part III,
infra, will provide more details as to the circumstances that should be in place to
ensure successful privatization.
It is useful at this stage to examine a few concrete instances of
privatization in the context of intellectual property. These existing models teach
important lessons as to both the benefits of privatization and the pitfalls one would
need to avoid when privatizing the trademark registration system.

85.
86.

Id. at 373.
William L. Megginson et al., The Financialand Operating Performance of

Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis, in 2 PRIVATIZATION AND
PUBLIC POLICY 340 (Vincent Wright & Luisa Perrotti eds., 2000). Steve Savas presents an

impressive array of studies that found cost and time savings in a great variety of settings
(such as postal service, printing, railroads, fire protection, legal services, and numerous
others) where contracting was used to replace government services. SAVAS, supra note 30,
at 149-67.
87.
For instance, one scholar is critical of problems with contract work in Iraq
and also states that 22% of local governments have reported privatization failures in other
contexts. Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization, Public-ization, and
Public Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111, 115-16 (2005) (citations omitted). She

also mentions privatization failures in the provision of medical care in jails and prisons. Id
at 115 n. 19 (citations omitted). Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder cite to failures in the
Russian utility privatization experience and discuss how scholars' views of privatization
have become more nuanced over time and now include considerations such as the identity
of the private actors involved, what type of self-dealing they face, and what their business
environment is. Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain,
92 CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1336-37 (2004).
88.
E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION:

89.
90.

Id. at t09-10.
Id. at 10-11.

THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNMENT

109 (1987).
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B. Examples of Privatization in Intellectual Property
1. ICANN
One of the most important examples in the context of intellectual property
and privatization is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN). The U.S. government delegated the management of internet numbers
and names to ICANN, a nonprofit corporation, in 1997 due to the tremendous
international expansion of the internet. 91 "The relevance and power of ICANN to
implement new policies for the internet is based on two main characteristics: (1)
the monopoly of the main Domain Name system in the Internet, and (2) the lack of
technological compatibility between competing Domain Name systems, preventing
other private firms from competing with ICANN."92 ICANN is charged with
accrediting registrars who can give out control over individual domain names to
applicants.93
Another of ICANN's key tasks was to design a system that would resolve
the increased number of conflicts between the domain-name registrants and the
owners of pre-existing trademarks. 94 ICANN implemented the Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), which specifies that a domain-name
owner has to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding under the following
conditions: if a complainant argues that the "domain name is identical or
confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has
rights," the domain-name owner has "no rights or legitimate interests in respect of
the domain name," and the "domain name has been registered and is being used in
bad faith."95 While an extensive discussion and complete evaluation of ICANN
and the UDRP is outside the scope of this Article, this Subsection seeks to present

91.
Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Marketfor PrivateDispute Resolution
Services-An Empirical Reassessment of ICANN-UDRP Performance, 11 MICH.

TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 285, 290 (2005). The detailed history of how the government
ended up delegating these powers to ICANN is more complex as a number of other
organizations were initially involved in the management of the domain-name system. For
further information, see, for example, id at 289-91. It also bears mentioning that
international pressures played a role in the formation of ICANN as many "believed the U.S.
government should not solely control a global resource like the Internet." Matthew T.
Sanderson, Candidates,Squatters, and Gripers: A Primeron PoliticalCybersquattinganda

Proposal for Reform, 8 ELECTION L.J. 3, 5 (2009). For a general discussion of the
privatization of the internet, see also Brett Frischmann, Privatization and
Commercialization of the Internet Infrastructure: Rethinking Market Intervention into
Government and Government Intervention into the Market, 2 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
1(2001).
92.
Kesan & Gallo, supra note 91, at 291.

93.

For a list of accredited registrars, see ICANN, ICANN-Accredited

Registrars, http://www.icann.org/registrars/accredited-list.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).
94.
Kesan & Gallo, supra note 91, at 291.
95.
ICANN, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy § 4(a) (Aug. 26,
1999), http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm. For further discussion of the
development of the UDRP, see Justin Hughes, The Internet and the Persistenceof Law, 44
B.C. L. REv. 359, 376-80 (2003).
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the basic framework of the system and highlight its principal advantages and flaws
in ways that will aid in constructing an optimized trademark registration model.96
The mission of ICANN is to enforce the stable and secure operation of
the internet's unique identifier systems by coordinating the allocation of domain
names, internet protocol addresses, and so on.97 Today, ICANN accredits registrars
that can then competitively register domain names for clients. At the inception of
this system, ICANN issued a set of guidelines that registrars would have to meet
before fulfilling this function, including financial and business qualifications for
potential registrars, and the payment to ICANN of a fixed fee of $5000, as well as
a variable fee of $1 per year for every domain-name registration.98 Registrars also
had to pay a one-time $10,000 fee to Network Solutions (the company that
previously held the monopoly on domain-name registrations) to obtain the proper
software that enabled them to actually perform registrations.99 Meanwhile,
Network Solutions fought to maintain a special status that allowed the company to
remain exempt from ICANN accreditation.100 Only after Network Solutions agreed
to a compromise solution in which it consented to divesting its registrar business
did competition
begin to thrive and did domain-name registration prices begin to
10 1
go down.
ICANN has had a significant effect on the domain-name market and its
transactions. Previously, complaints about poor service by the then-monopoly
Network Solutions and an annual fee of $35 for domain-name registration plagued
the registration system. 102 Domain-name applicants now have numerous choices as

96.
A word of caution is warranted here. While ICANN provides a useful
analogy as a privatized device in the intellectual-property world, the registration of domain
names and that of trademarks certainly exhibits significant differences. Most importantly,
awarding domain-name registrations tends to be a fairly routine task that does not require
complex judgments. That alone means that one could not simply "copy" the ICANN system
one for one and apply it to trademarks. While the ICANN experience is encouraging in
some respects, for instance because the system lowered application fees, trademark
registration raises a host of issues-many of which are unrelated to domain-name
registration-that this Article seeks to address in turn. I thank Jacqueline Lipton and others
for their comments on this subject.
97.
ICANN, Bylaws (May 19, 2008), http://www.icann.org/general/
bylaws.htm#I.
98.
MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE
TAMING OF CYBERSPACE 188 (2002).
99.
Id.; see also ICANN, NSI-Registrar License and Agreement (Nov. 9, 1999),
http://www.icann.org/en/nsi/nsi-rla-04nov99.htm.
100.
MUELLER, supra note 98, at 194.
101.
Id. at 188, 194-96. ICANN continues, however, to charge a number of
substantial fees such as a $2500 application fee, $4000 yearly accreditation fee, and variable
fee billed every quarter that is between $1200 and $2000 per quarter. ICANN, Registrar
Accreditations: Financial Considerations, http://www.icann.org/registrars/ accreditationfinancials.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2008). Other conditions include a working capital
requirement of $70,000 and commercial general liability insurance coverage of at least
$500,000. Id.
102.
Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 TEx. L. REV. 715, 727 n.62
(2003) (internal citations omitted).
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to which registrar to use 10 3 and can pay below $10 for registration. 1 4 This
experience allows for optimism in the area of trademark registration and suggests
that implementing a system with true competition amongst registrars could lead to
significant savings and increased client satisfaction there as well.
The area related to ICANN that has generated the greatest amount of
discussion is the implementation of the UDRP. The UDRP's proponents state that
before the UDRP, "trademark claims against domain-name registrants were too
long, too expensive, and the results were too unpredictable."' °Skeptics believe,
however, that the UDRP encourages forum-shopping and is biased in favor of
trademark holders, who always constitute the complainants in these types of
cases. 106 In response to the criticism that the UDRP does not contain the
procedural protections that courts afford, proponents say: "It was not intended
to.

1 0° 7

To proponents, the speed and low price of UDRP procedures precisely stem

from the ways in which the system is different from the legal system, and the
proponents emphasize
that the remedies available to UDRP arbitrators are limited
1
accordingly. 08
Translated to the world of trademark registration, concerns with forumshopping might arise if applicants chose registrars on the basis of their likelihood
to register a desired mark rather than other measures of quality. In the ICANN
context, some critics such as Michael Froomkin and David Post have pointed out:
Complainant choice has the useful property of promoting
price competition. Unfortunately, economic theory suggests that it
also will tend to promote other types of competition, including
competition among dispute resolution service providers to be
perceived as being most "complainant-friendly" in order to capture
all, or a disproportionate share, of the market. We consider this to be

103.

ICANN, supra note 95.

104.

See,

e.g.,

GoDaddy.com,

Domain

Name

Search

Tool,

https://www.godaddy.com/gdshop/registrar/search.asp?ci=8990 (offering domain names for
around $9) (last visited Aug. 12, 2008); see also JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM Wu,WHO
CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 170 (2006) (noting the
"dramatic drop in the price of registration" that ICANN delivered).
105.
Edward C. Anderson & Timothy S. Cole, The UDRP-A Model for Dispute
Resolution in E-Commerce?, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 235, 236 (2002).
106.
See, e.g., Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An Examination of the Allegations of
Systemic Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 903, 905 (2002).

107.
Anderson & Cole, supra note 105, at 239.
108.
Id. Further, the UDRP-while mandatory-is nonbinding, and parties
seeking to attack or defend particular domain names can choose to take cases to court. See,
e.g., Justin Hughes, Of World Music and Sovereign States, Professorsand the Formationof

Legal Norms, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 155, 171 (2003) (citing ICANN, Uniform Domain Name
Dispute-Resolution Policy (Sept. 29, 1999), http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy29sept99.htm); see also Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1125(d) (2006) (providing for legal cause of action against cybersquatting).
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a very serious issue, as even the appearance of partiality would
so
09
taint the UDRP as to call the entire enterprise into question.'
Froomkin and Post suggest the introduction of the calculation of market
concentration through mechanisms such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
to measure if competition is functioning adequately. 110 They explain that if this
analysis showed a heightened degree of concentration, further investigation would
be warranted given the "appearance of impropriety."" '1 They add that
concentration could stem from benign factors such as price differences between
providers, and they believe that comparing different firms' prices could
demonstrate whether the causes are indeed these benign factors. 112 The situation is
actually likely to be more complicated, as factors other than price or unfair
preference for complainants could account for significant market concentration.
Speed of process and quality of service could produce great differences in market
share that society would want to encourage. Nonetheless, Froomkin and Post's
point is well-taken that large differences-both when judging the UDRP context
and when evaluating a privatized trademark registration model geared toward
competition-should be examined carefully if discovered.
Trademark registration, unlike the UDRP, does not pit two private parties
against one another, at least not in its initial stages and not in the majority of cases.
Rather, trademark registration involves the interest of a trademark applicant and
the more amorphous interest of society at large. Another key distinction is the
following: in the UDRP context, it is virtually always in the complainant's
financial interest to win her case, whether she has an objectively legitimate claim
or not. She has usually already invested money in a brand name or the like and
now seeks to protect its use in cyberspace. In the case of trademark registrants,
unlike what appears to be a common assumption, it is not as universally in the
registrant's financial interest to have just any mark registered. Even leaving aside
the possibility of the registrant having to deal with public opposition in the
process, a mark that does not follow the requirements of the Lanham Act risks
later attacks through litigation. As a result, the owner may have to: (1) pay legal
fees both to defend actions and to pay for damages; (2) suffer reputational damage
if he is depicted as an intellectual property "thief' or infringer of various sorts; and
(3) build a new mark if the current one is held to be invalid. Thus, he is usually
13
better off selecting and registering a mark that conforms to the Lanham Act.1
109.
Michael Froomkin & David Post, Froomkin and Post Send Letter to ICANN
Board (Jan. 26, 2000), http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/postfroomkin udrp letter.htm.
Some scholars would say that these types of concerns were validated in the following years
and criticize the UDRP accordingly. For an extensive discussion of these issues, see the
sources cited in footnote 114, infra.

110.

Id. For a more extensive discussion of the HHI, see, for example, Neil B.

Cohen & Charles A. Sullivan, The Herfindahl-HirschmanIndex and the New Antitrust

Merger Guidelines: Concentratingon Concentration,62 TEX. L. REv. 453 (1983).
111.
Froomkin & Post, supra note 109.
112.
Id.
113.
An individual who is deliberately using a trademark in an infringing manner
may also be less likely to wish to draw attention to this use by attempting to register his
mark. I would like to thank Rebecca Tushnet for her comments in this Section.
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As will be discussed in Part III.C, there are also other measures that can
protect the quality of privately performed trademark registrations and that should
allay the fears of UDRP critics while allowing for
a registration system of greater
14
productivity and flexibility than the current one.'

A recent proposal introduces more ideas on how to fix the way that ICANN handles
domain-name disputes, such as introducing an "'IP Registry' of sanctioned names that could
then be restricted to their 'owners.' Brand holders would bear the burden of proof,
according to ICANN-defined procedures, of establishing their ownership of a brand name."
Thomas M. Lenard & Lawrence J. White, ICANN at a Crossroads:A Proposalfor Better
Governance and Performance, Technology Policy Institute, at 20 (Mar. 2009),
http://www.techpolicyinstitute.org/files/icann%20at%20a%20crossroads 1.pdf.
Another
suggestion is to create
a 'loser pays' policy for the UDRP, where the losing party would pay the
litigation costs of the prevailing rights holder. This would provide an
incentive for applicants to make sure that they weren't infringing on a
trademark or copyrighted name, or at least quickly to relinquish their
claim on a name when the legitimate owner made a complaint.
Id. Additionally, the authors provide a helpful discussion of the experience of other
standard-setting organizations outside the intellectual-property context; while addressing
their specifics is outside the scope of this article, they could provide further guidance if the
proposal delineated here enters a phase that requires detailed policy-making. Id.at 32-48
(discussing the American National Standards Institute, the Depository Trust & Clearing
Corporation, the International Telecommunication Union, the National Automated
Clearinghouse Association, Nay Canada, the North American Numbering Plan
Administrator, the Options Clearing Corporation, and the Universal Postal Union).
114.
This piece does not purport to address all criticisms of the UDRP and
ICANN generally. The creation of ICANN and the UDRP has raised a number of issues that
are either unrelated to trademark registration or that go beyond the scope of this Article. For
more extensive discussions of some of these questions, see, for example, Edward Brunet,
Defending Commerce's ContractDelegation of Power to ICANN, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 1 (2002); Jose MA. Emmanuel A. Caral, Lessons from ICANN: Is Self-Regulation of
the Internet Fundamentally Flawed?, 12 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 1 (2004); Susan P.
Crawford, The ICANN Experiment, 12 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 409 (2004); A.
Michael Froomkin, ICANN's "Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy "-Causes and (Partial)
Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 605 (2002); A. Michael Froomkin & Mark A. Lemley, ICANN
andAntitrust, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 1 (2003); Victoria Holstein-Childress, Lex Cyberus: The
UDRP as a Gatekeeper to JudicialResolution of Competing Rights to Domain Names, 109
PENN ST. L. REV. 565 (2004); Jay P. Kesan, PrivateInternet Governance, 35 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 87 (2003); Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Pondering the Politics of Private
Procedures: The Case of ICANN, 4 J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SoC'Y 345 (2008),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1028128; David E. Sorkin, Judicial
Review of ICANN Domain Name Dispute Decisions, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 35 (2001); Luke A. Walker, ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 289 (2000); Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem
of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187 (2000); John G. White, ICANN's Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy in Action, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 229 (2001). For a discussion
of the UDRP's impact on free speech matters, see Jacqueline D. Lipton, Commerce Versus
Commentary: Gripe Sites, Parody, and the FirstAmendment in Cyberspace, 84 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1327, 1353-61 (2006).
The ICANN experience also brings up other issues that are outside the scope of this
article but could provide guidance for the implementation of the proposal delineated here.
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2. Certification Marks
In the Lanham Act, the term "certification mark" refers to a type of mark
used by a person other than its owner "to certify regional or other origin, material,
mode of manufacture, quality, accuracy, or other characteristics of such person's
goods or services or that the work or labor on the goods or services was performed
by members of a union or other organization."' 1 5 One example of such a mark is
the Orthodox Union's (OU) trademark consisting of the letter U in a circle that
certifies a product as kosher." 6 While the PTO awards a particular mark to a
private organization that wishes to use it for certification purposes, it is the
organization that independently sets the standards that someone's product will
have to meet to use the mark. The PTO can, at any point, cancel a certification
mark if its owner fails to control its use, produces goods himself to which the mark
is applied, allows the use of the mark for purposes other than certification, or
refuses to certify or continue to certify the goods of individuals in a discriminatory
manner."17 Thus, the PTO continues to regulate the use of a certification mark
much past the actual moment of its registration, and the mark owner's decisions as
to how to award the right 8to use his mark are restricted both by procedural
concerns and public policy."
While many individuals and companies wish to affix a certification mark
voluntarily to increase consumer trust in their products, there has been an "increase
in the number, type, and uses of certification marks [that] can be attributed in part
to changes in global product safety and conformity assessment regulations."' 9 The

One example is the splintering off of the WHOIS database, which allows users to identify
who owns and operates particular domain names, into several databases in the privatization
process. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You-Fool Us
Twice Shame on Us: What We Can Learn from the Privatizationsof the Internet Backbone

Network and the Domain Name System, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89, 183 (2001). Other examples
of issues that deserve further study based on the ICANN experience are domain tasting
(where applicants register and delete significant numbers of domain names after a short test
period) and domain sniping (where applicants register a domain name immediately after its
former application has expired, though ICANN has taken some measures to address this
problem). I appreciate my discussions with Justin Hughes and Eric Goldman on these
topics. For a discussion of domain tasting, see, for example, Christopher Healey, Domain
Tasting Is Taking over the Internet as a Result of ICANN's "Add Grace Period," 2007
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9 (2007).

115.
116.

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
See Orthodox Union, http://www.oukosher.org (last visited July 3, 2008). A

variety of other certification marks exist that designate products as kosher. See, e.g.,
EarthKosher Inc., Reg. No. 3110495 (mark consisting of a K inside an earth globe);
Chicago Rabbinical Council, Reg. No. 3192909 (IKS Kosher mark); Vaad Hakashrus of
Crown Heights Corporation New York, Reg. No. 3131894 (CHK mark).
117.
15 U.S.C. § 1064(5) (2006).
118.
For a more extensive discussion of the obligations of certification-mark
owners, see Terry E. Holtzman, Tips from the Trademark Examining Operation, 81
TRADEMARK REP. 180 (1991).
119.
Mark R. Barron, Comment, Creating Consumer Confidence or Confusion?
The Role of Product Certification Marks in the Market Today, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REv. 413, 418 (2007).
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use of certification marks for the purpose of increasing consumer confidence may
present disadvantages as well. There is likely to be some disparity in the quality of
certification-mark management amongst different owners, with some of these
owners being more careful about awarding and monitoring marks than others. This
lack of homogeneity allows for the possibility of competition between different
certification marks. It also gives individuals who want to affix said marks a greater
variety of choices between slightly different marks and lets them choose the
certification-mark owners that provide the most effective services.
One scholar has argued that the American certification-mark system
largely works well and in fact possesses some distinct advantages over its
European counterparts. 20 The French system of appellations d'origine contr6les
(AOC) provides a stark contrast to certification marks. It is based on the idea of
"terroir"--the notion that there is a relationship between the land on which a
product is grown and the qualities the product possesses as a result.12' The AOC
system is directed by the Institut National des Appellations d'Origine (INAO),
which is currently part of the Ministry of Agriculture. 122 The INAO regulates a
variety of product requirements, such as "for wine, the grape varietals, hectare
production quotas, natural alcohol content during vinification, permitted irrigation,
etc." 23 As discussed, unlike the AOC system, in the United States the PTO does
not dictate standards for certification. 24 As a result, certification marks are able to
offer greater flexibility than the system of AOC, particularly because the
conditions for a specific AOC can only be modified if "the government agency is
convinced to make the change."' 25 Theoretically, the French system should at least
bring about more stability and encourage consumers to learn to read the
information on wine labels given that said information is unlikely to change
quickly. 126 In reality, however, French and other consumers find the labeling
confusing, leading many to the conclusion that the American system has "tapped
' 27
into a simpler, more efficient system of communicating wine characteristics."'

120.
Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: The Spirited Debate About
Geographical Indications, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 336-37 (2006).
121.
Id.at 307.
122.
Id. For a brief description of the AOC system provided by the French
Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, see France Diplomatie, French FoodAppellation d'Origine Controlee: A Regional Label of Excellence, http://
www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/france_1 59/discovering-france_2005/france-from-to-z_1978/
life-in-france_5279/french-food 5356/appellation-origine-controlee-regional-label-ofexcellence_8389.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2008).
123.
Hughes, supra note 120, at 307.
124.
Id. at 310.
125.
Id.at 336. But see Rosemary J. Coombe et al., Bearing CulturalDistinction:
Informational Capitalismand New Expectationsfor Intellectual Property,40 U.C. DAvis L.
REv. 891, 900-01 (2007) (describing how the idea of AOC has led to some advantages with
regard to claims of tradition and authenticity that European wines have enjoyed for
centuries).
126.
Hughes, supra note 120, at 336-37.
127.
Id. at 337.
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Furthermore, there is a consensus among wine-industry experts
128 that the AOC
system discourages innovation while the American one fosters it.
A recent proposal suggests that certification marks might even be
increasingly used to address complex political problems. Given the difficulty in
having Congress pass the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) that
would prohibit employment discrimination based on sexual orientation, Ian Ayres
proposed the use of a certification mark as a means for employers to commit to the
substantive obligations associated with ENDA.129 Essentially, Ayres's mark would
not certify that an employer does not discriminate, but would rather certify that an
employer has promised not to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation and
"has granted all of its employees and applicants express third-party beneficiary
status to remedy any breach of the nondiscrimination promise."' 3 ° The third-party
beneficiaries would consist of everyone who would be covered by ENDA if it
were passed, which means actual and potential employees as well as governmental
civil-rights enforcement agencies.' 31 Ayres's proposal bypasses the problems
inherent in adopting a controversial bill and gives businesses the freedom to (1)
fulfill the conditions necessary to affix his mark, (2) refuse to affix any mark of
this type, or (3) seek out a certification mark with an alternative message. He thus
provides a creative model to address a complex problem through the use of a
privately awarded mark.
The certification-mark system is a prime example of a form of publicprivate partnership in the trademark arena. This model could extend to the entire
trademark registration system by having the government award the right to a
number of private registrars to give out use over a regular rather than certification
mark to other individuals. As in the certification-mark context, the awarding entity
itself would not be the one using the mark on its products but would rather
designate who can use it. Also, the PTO and courts could become involved if
someone made illegitimate use of a mark.
3. Peer-To-Patent
Aside from the delays in the patent system already mentioned, a number
of scholars have argued that there is also a significant problem with patent quality,
which leads to a number of social costs. 132 Beth Noveck has suggested that many
patents are "vague and overbroad, lack novelty, and fail the constitutional mandate
'[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."" 133 She suggests that this
128.
Id. at 338.
129.
Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Mark(et)ing Nondiscrimination:
Privatizing ENDA with a Certification Mark, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1639, 1641 (2006)
[hereinafter Ayres & Brown, Mark(et)ing Nondiscrimination]; see also Ian Ayres &
Jennifer Gerarda Brown, PrivatizingEmployment Protections, 49 ARIz. L. REv. 587 (2007).
130.
Ayres & Brown, Mark(et)ing Nondiscrimination,supra note 129, at 1644.
131.
Id. at 1645.
132.
See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do PatentsPurchase?In Search
of Optimal Ignorance in the PatentOffice, 40 Hous. L. REv. 1219 (2004).
133.
Beth Simone Noveck, "Peer to Patent": Collective Intelligence, Open
Review, andPatent Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 123 (2006) (citing U.S. CONST. art.

1, § 8, cl. 8). Other commentators have pointed out the problems with vague or overbroad
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situation stems from a lack of access to information on the part of the PTO and
that, due to reasons such as lack of resources, patent examiners "neither consult the
public, talk to experts, nor, in many cases, even use the Internet."' 34 Noveck
proposes a system of "peer-to-patent" open review in which the public could
provide input in the examinations of patents by submitting to the PTO prior art
relevant to particular patent applications. 135 The public could also become involved
by rating patent claims, commenting on prior-art submissions, ranking prior-art
submissions, and rating other contributors. 136 Noveck likens this system to an open
scholarly debate that would serve not only the needs of the patent examination
process but could even inform more general scientific discussions.' 37 She also
underlines the democratizing effect of her proposal because it allows private
individuals greater participation in legal processes
and makes the government
38
accountable to the larger public in novel ways.'
The peer-to-patent model essentially represents a proposal to inject
private forces and their know-how into a public institution. In June 2007, the PTO
adopted the model as a pilot study involving applicants who volunteered their
materials for open review in exchange for priority in the examination of their
applications. 139 As of April 2008, the PTO hailed the results of the study as a
success: of the nineteen applications examined at that point, each was examined by
an average of fourteen reviewers who submitted five examples of prior art per
application; of the nineteen applications, five received nonfinal rejections based on
the input of the private reviewers.1 40 Some suggest that these five rejected
applications may
41 well have slipped through the cracks had they undergone regular
PTO review. 1
Doug Lichtman and Mark Lemley have criticized the model because,
while they could think of many knowledgeable potential volunteer patent
patents. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable PatentRights, 60 STAN. L.
REv. 863, 870 (2007) (noting the innovation-stifling effect of overbroad patents); Jonathan
M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOzO L. REv. 1251, 1277
(2004) (stating that "most issued patents are vague to a significant degree and therefore
vulnerable to infringement attempts by, and boundary disputes with, third-party
innovators"); Michael Risch, The Failureof Public Notice in Patent Prosecution,21 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 179, 181 (2007) (explaining that potential competitors can suffer from vague
patents if the competitors are uncertain about infringement and then get sued, and that
patentees can be harmed as well if vague patents are interpreted in ways that contradict their
initial understanding of the patent).
134.
Noveck, supra note 133, at 124.
135.
Id. at 145.
136.
Id. at 147. Individuals can view online and provide input into the
applications that are a current part of this project on a specialized website. Peer to Patent,
Community Patent Review, http://www.peertopatent.org/patent/list (last visited Aug. 12,
2008).
137.
Noveck, supra note 133, at 154.
138.
Id. at 145.
139.
Patents: Peer-to-Patent Project Has Already ProducedResults, Sponsors,
PTO Say, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (BNA), D-12 (Apr. 28, 2008).

140.
141.

Id.
Id.
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examiners, "few of those individuals are likely to work for free, let alone do so on
a project so intellectually unrewarding as poking holes in dud patent applications,"
and the two scholars likened reading problematic applications to "grading F term
papers," which "may not draw qualified volunteer reviewers in sufficient numbers
to make peer review more than a pilot project."' 142 Despite the touted success of the
peer-to-patent pilot study, it is entirely possible that the project drew reviewers due
to its novelty and that this interest would not endure. It is alternatively conceivable
that while some scientific areas would draw sufficient reviewers, this result would
not translate to all types of patent applications. The private examiners-despite
their volunteer status-were able to provide input no less valuable than that of
professional PTO examiners, but the benefits of Noveck's proposal could be
significantly multiplied by taking into account Lichtman and Lemley's concerns.
One could do so by changing the incentive structure surrounding private input and
especially using paid individuals instead of volunteers. Ideally, society could enjoy
the expertise of private individuals in intellectual property in an organized setting
that would provide both incentives through remuneration and high-quality
contributions through mechanisms such as competition from other actors and
various quality-monitoring measures.

III. A MODEL FOR PRIVATIZING TRADEMARK REGISTRATION
The foregoing examples show how private forces have already had an
impact on various areas of intellectual property. As in the privatization of other
services, the involvement of private individuals and organizations in numerous
contexts has had such positive effects as lowering prices through competition,
providing a greater variety of choices and increased flexibility to consumers,
having the government benefit from the know-how of private individuals who may
have otherwise remained outside a number of decision-making processes, and
democratizing legal processes by involving said individuals. In the hope of
improving the effectiveness of the trademark registration system for the benefit of
both applicants and the public, this Article will now attempt to propose a model for
registration that provides the advantages of privatization while avoiding some of
its possible pitfalls. In particular, this Part will focus on three key features. First, it
will discuss the use of competing private entities to provide registration services.
Second, it will introduce the idea of flexible price schedules into the registration
system. Third, it will discuss quality-enforcement mechanisms meant to keep
private registrars in check. This Part will also respond to possible criticisms of a

142.
Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption
of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REv. 45, 46 n.4 (2007). The peer-to-patent model is only one of

many examples where individuals are providing volunteer work on the intemet to contribute
to various projects, one of the most famous other examples being Wikipedia. For further
discussions on that topic, see, for example, Don Tapscott & Anthony D. Williams,
WIKINOMIcs: How MASS COLLABORATION CHANGES EVERYTHING (2006); Yochai Benkler,

Coase's Penguin, Or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002). But see
Eric Goldman, Wikipedia Will Fail in Four Years (Dec. 5, 2006), Technology & Marketing
Law Blog, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2006/12/wikipedia-will 1.htm (predicting
the downfall of Wikipedia, mentioning among other things the fact that contributors do not
get paid).
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privatized trademark registration system and suggest other policy areas that may
benefit from some of the ideas associated with the model presented here.
A. Multiple Competing Private Registrars
The key goal of privatization is to introduce competition and market
forces into public services, enterprises, and asset use. 14 3 One expert on
privatization, Steve Savas, argues that privatization, in the context of contracting,
is effective when the following conditions are met: "(1) the work to be done is
specified unambiguously; (2) several potential producers are available, and a
competitive climate either exists or can be created and sustained; (3) the
government is able to monitor the contractor's performance; and (4) appropriate
terms are included in the contract document and enforced." 144 While this Article
focuses on opening the registration markets to private actors altogether rather than
having paid government contractors, Savas's test for contractors is still a useful
tool to evaluate the necessary conditions for privatization in the current context:
(1) there is a need for clarity in the description of work that society would want
private registrars to perform; (2) a competitive climate would need to exist; (3)
registrars would need to be monitored through governmental and/or private means;
and (4) effective regulations would have to be put in place to sustain such a system
of private registrars. This Article suggests that the introduction of private
competing registrars, if implemented properly, could fulfill these conditions and
improve productivity.
First, the task of trademark registration can be specified unambiguously.
Private attomeys-most likely organized as part of entities similar to firmswould have to search the registry (which would remain a collective one to
maintain the current advantages of federal registration) and determine whether an
applicant's mark infringes on any existing trademark.145 They would then need to
decide whether a mark conforms to the conditions stated in the Lanham Act. This
work would be no different from the work currently performed by trademark
examiners at the PTO.
Second, competition would need to exist to fulfill Savas's conditions.
The fact that numerous law firms already perform very similar work when they
assist individuals in applying for trademarks suggests that several private
organizations would be both willing and able to perform trademark registration
services. In fact, many firms specialize exclusively in providing this type of
service, i.e., they search the PTO's registry and ensure that applicants' marks
conform to all other requirements. Applicants can find these firms most easily
143.
SAVAS, supra note 30, at 122; see also JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE
PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDs, PRIVATE MEANS 222 (1989); Kesan & Shah, supra
note 114 (discussing the need for competition in the context of the privatization of the
internet).
144.
SAVAS, supra note 30, at 109.

145.
Similarly, the Trademark Official Gazette that records trademark
applications and allows for public opposition would remain in the hands of a single entity,
be it private or public. To view copies of the Gazette, see U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
Trademark Official Gazette, http://www.uspto.gov/web/trademarks/tmog/ (last visited Jan.

20, 2009).
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through an online search that leads to their websites. 146 These entities would likely
want to perform the task of registering marks if they were allowed, as that could
lead to additional revenue. Further, these firms could serve as models for lawyers
and entrepreneurs who would be interested in entering the registration business.
Third, society would have to be able to monitor performance. Part III.C
will discuss the role of both governmental and private quality-enforcement
mechanisms in this context. Finally, any governmental regulation of private
entities would need to be clear and actually enforced. Careful drafting would be
necessary at the regulation stage, and registrars that did not meet their obligations
would have to be shut down.
A number of lessons can be learned from the initial privatization of the
domain-name system (DNS), which-as mentioned in Part II.B.1-involved the
delegation of power to organizations outside the government such as Network
Solutions, Inc. and ICANN. The DNS privatization lacked transparency in
decision-making, there was insufficient public input into crucial decisions, and
government-subsidized companies impeded competition, which led to the
introduction of only limited competition for the DNS. 47 In the model proposed
here, there would be no government-subsidized companies but rather
nonsubsidized private firms. The number of registrars would not be limited;
instead, the needs of the market would determine those numbers. The government
would set out regulations that firms would have to fulfill to become registrars and
then it would allow anyone who meets the relevant conditions to serve as a
registrar. The government might impose requirements such as evidence of an
infrastructure that could support registration or certain credentials on the part of
private trademark examiners. Drawing from the DNS privatization experience, it
would be best if the crafting of these regulations were as transparent as possible
and open to public comment. The regulations should also remain free of favoritism
toward any particular constituency that might have an interest in entering the
registration business,148 Some work has recently suggested that ICANN "should be
accountable to external parties" and that "[i]nternal procedures are not
sufficient. 149 Creating safeguards that protect principles of accountability and thus
146.
See,
e.g.,
Augustyn
Law
Office,
Trademark
Search,
http://alawoffice.com/trademark/search/?gclid=COXNiP2215 QCFQgfswodEzwI1Q
(last
visited July 23, 2008); Creative Trademark Services, Trademark Search,
http://www.creativetrademark.com/ (last visited July 23, 2008); Government Liaison
Services, Inc., GLS Services, http://www.trademarkinfo.com/ (last visited July 23, 2008);
TradeMark Express, Expert Trademark Legal Research and Application Services,
http://www.tmexpress.com/index.php?gclid=CLne6M-315QCFSXNIgodvl3tkQ (last visited
July 23, 2008). This is just a sampling of existing services that specialize in searching the
trademark registry and filing applications; there are numerous other firms performing this
type of work.
147.
Kesan & Shah, supra note 114, at 94.
148.
For instance, poorly drafted regulations could excessively favor large
businesses or attorneys that have particular types of work experience that may not directly
relate to the registration process.
149.
Lenard & White, supra note 113, at 16. To address some of the other
concerns about ICANN, Lenard and White further suggest including the implementation of
"a competitive application process, whereby prospective generic top-level domains (gTLD)
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also transparency is a key part of designing a privatized system of trademark
registration, and this Article proposes a number of such measures in Part III.C. 150
One potential financial regulation for trademark registrars might set the
necessary starting capital and resources required of registrars so that applicants are
guaranteed a minimum level of service. Such a requirement would lower the risk
of seeing a registrar fail as a business in the middle of an application. In the case of
ICANN, applicants were initially required to have $100,000 in liquid capital,
$500,000 in liability insurance, a reliable computer infrastructure, and a minimum
of five employees.' 51 Some of these conditions have changed over time; for
instance, the guidelines currently require applicants to have $70,000 in liquid
capital.152 When establishing the proper figures, regulators should consider the fact
that there is little need for an expensive infrastructure to set up a basic registrar
business. In fact, it would be unsurprising to see many private examiners
telecommute,1 53 thus making access to a computer network and the trademarks
database the primary capital barriers to entry. 5 4 While there may be some
governmental requirements for fundamental knowledge of trademark law on the
part of private examiners, regulations regarding start-up capital should mostly
show restraint.
To prevent self-dealing, the government may also want to restrict a
trademark registrar's ability to register marks for itself or any business affiliates.
This would avoid some of the accusations that were made in the ICANN context,
where Afilias, the manager of the .info domain-name space, reserved for itself
domains such as Dot.info, Search.info, Directory.info, and Email.info, "which
many in the Internet community view[ed] as an illegitimate attempt to hoard
valuable domain names."'' 55 Of course, hoarding marks is not quite as simple as
hoarding domain names because a trademark applicant must at least show goodfaith intent to use a mark for any sort of registration. Nonetheless, it remains an
issue that regulators should consider when building the appropriate legal
operators would compete by proposing registry terms, including price, for new gTLDs and
for renewals." Id. at 18.
150.
For instance, as discussed infra, one measure that enhances accountability
indirectly improves transparency in this proposal by having the PTO conduct random
checks of registrars' work and thus produce more public information as to the registrars'
performance. Lenard and White suggest that ICANN's nature as a nonprofit entity,
combined with the way it is funded, makes it almost inherently less accountable than a
regular private for-profit company, which is closer to the type of entity that this model
envisions. Id. at 22.
151.
Chander, supra note 102, at 727 n.63 (internal citation omitted).
152.
ICANN,
Registrar
Accreditation:
Financial
Considerations,
http://www.icann.org/registrars/accreditation-financials.htm (last visited July 30, 2008).
153.
Fifty-eight percent of trademark employees already telecommute at least one
day a week. U.S.

PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

YEAR 2008 22. (2008), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/com/annual/ 2008/2008annualreport.pdf.
154.
A small percentage of applications may require legal research beyond the
basic database searches, but those cases are unlikely to significantly increase the ideal startup capital.
155.
Chander, supra note 102, at 765 n.285.
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framework. While regulators should take these factors into account, their foremost
focus should remain on providing a regime that promotes and sustains competition
in the marketplace.
It is important to note that in this competitive system, the PTO would
likely retain its role in dispute resolution. The vast majority of privately registered
trademarks would encounter no public opposition. If there was public opposition,
or if an individual requested cancellation of a mark, the PTO could resolve the
question, and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), as well as the
courts, would continue to hear any appeals. This would avoid the problems that
critics have raised in the UDRP context. 156 While a system of private arbitration is
conceivable for some of these disputes and such an option remains worth exploring
for its productivity-enhancing features, its proponents would need to provide
answers to the difficult questions that would arise as a result. 157 In any case, the
model presented here does not preclude the implementation of such arbitration
options down the line should they appear beneficial.
The model does assume, however, that the determinations of private
entities at the registration stage will continue to receive the presumption of validity
for marks that PTO registration entails. This means that if a mark were challenged
in litigation, courts would presume a mark to be valid, and the challenging party
would have the burden of overcoming that presumption.1 58 There are a number of
examples in other areas where the government similarly lends the determinations
of private actors such a presumption in legal proceedings, even when the
presumption affects the right of third private parties. For example, in some
jurisdictions the decision of a private condemner to take land is awarded a
presumption of validity.' 59 Also, nominating petitions for political candidates that
are circulated, signed, and filed, are generally presumed to be valid in court; it is
the challenger who has the burden of proving that an individual who signed the
156.

See supra Part II.B. 1.

157.
One of the problems with this model arises out of the complications of
choosing an arbitrator for such disputes. If the plaintiff chooses the arbitrator, some of the
concerns from the UDRP context could arise here as well and there would be a need for
another layer of monitoring to ensure the fairness of proceedings. If the public chooses one,
this could impose costs on the public to research and decide on an arbitrator each time an
individual from the public chooses to oppose a mark.
158.
An alternative system might provide different levels of rigor in examinations
based on applicants' needs and then varying presumptions in courts depending on the type
of examination used. While such a feature to the model could provide certain advantages, it
obviously also introduces a number of complications; its efficacy may best be evaluated at a
later point, some time after the initial model is in place and its results have been studied. For
discussions about introducing different levels of examination in the patent context, see, for
example, Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 142; Kristen Osenga, EntranceRamps, Tolls, and
Express Lanes-Proposalsfor Decreasing Traffic Congestion in the Patent Office, 33 FLA.

ST. U. L. REv. 119 (2005). I am grateful to Graeme Dinwoodie for the discussion we had on
this subject.
159.
See, e.g., Wiard Mem'l Park Dist. v. Wiard Cmty. Pool, Inc., 52 P.3d 1080,
1083 n.5 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). Oregon statutory law makes a distinction in the language that
it uses for the presumptions that the determinations of private versus public condemners
carry, but both types of determinations are presumptively valid. See id.
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petition is not a qualified elector. 160 The due execution of a will, which requires no
governmental action, makes the will carry a presumption of validity in court, and
any third parties challenging the will have the burden of overcoming that
presumption.1 61 The certificates of acknowledgment that a notary public issues
carry a strong presumption of validity.162 The conduct of private attorneys also
benefits from a strong presumption that it falls within a broad range of reasonable
professional assistance. 63 The decisions of private trademark registrars would
receive the same type of deference in64this model and would, ideally, be treated the
same way as today's PTO decisions.1
B. Flexible Price Schedules and Registration Processing Speeds
A private system of competing registrars will allow for increased price
discrimination. The PTO already offers some expedited processing in the patent
context (aside from the peer-to-patent test cases mentioned previously), but private
registrars could offer many more options that could guarantee different prices and
different speeds of processing. Currently, certain patents can receive expedited
consideration depending on the applicant's age or health or if the invention will
materially improve the quality of the environment, lead to the development or
conservation of energy resources, or assist in countering terrorism. 65 Even those
patent applications that qualify, however, are only guaranteed a pendency of no
more than twelve months. 66 The PTO also allows for the expedited processing of
design patents for an extra fee. 67 When this design patent rule was proposed in
1998, Nike Inc. responded very positively to the planned change, noting that 168
it
would avail itself of this possibility for 100 to 150 design applications per year.
Nike also noted the importance of the opportunity to "maximize a patentee's
protection by synchronizing protection with the retail market launch" of a product
and explained that Nike would be willing to pay the additional fees "only if the
PTO set a timed goal for the issuance of design patent applications that are filed
complete and ready for expedited processing."' 169 The company further explained:
160.
See, e.g., Jenkins v. Hale, 190 P.3d 175, 176-77 (Ariz. 2008).
161.
See, e.g., In re Malnar's Estate, 243 N.W.2d 435, 439 (Wis. 1976) (citing In
re Estate of Barnes, 112 N.W.2d 142 (Wis. 1961)).
162.
See, e.g., Alfieri v.Guild Times Pension Plan, 446 F.Supp. 2d 99, 109-10
(E.D.N.Y.2006) (citation omitted).
163.
See, e.g., Miller v. State, 914 So. 2d 800, 803 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
164.
Itisworth noting that whenever courts lend the "presumption of innocence"
to the actions of a private party, they basically state that the party's actions have
presumptive legal validity. This remains the case whether the litigation involves the state
and the private party, or rather a private party that may have injured another private party.
165.
Advancement of Examination, 37 C.F.R. § 1.102 (2009).
166.
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Accelerated Patent Examination, http://
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/action/aepl0.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
167.
Expedited Examination of Design Applications, 37 C.F.R. § 1.155(a)(3)(i)
(2009).
168.
Nike, Inc., Comment on Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding
Changes
to
Implement
the
Patent
Business
Goals
(Dec.
4,
1998),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/oplalcomments/anpr/c05.htm.

169.

Id.
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"Without such a goal for issuance, the PTO's additional fee for the expedited
procedure is a one-way bargain, and one that customers are not likely to utilize
especially given the high processing fee [of $900]." ' 7° It appears, however, that
while the PTO's procedure for design patents allows for applications to be
considered out of turn, it does not guarantee that the17application
will be examined
1
within any particular time-frame as some had hoped.
This is precisely the type of issue the market is well-equipped to handle.
The commercial world is replete with examples of services where customers are
happy to pay more in exchange for a guarantee of speedy processing; overnight
shipping and expedited printing are only two examples of many. Virtually any
service can be performed faster or more optimally if one is willing to pay more for
it. In a competitive market, where there is a need for speed, there is usually
someone willing to meet that need, for a mutually agreeable price.
Calls for speedier trademark registration are not unique to the United
States but are resonating all over the world. In December 2005, the British
Government commissioned Andrew Gowers, the editor of the Financial Times, to
examine whether intellectual property law in the United Kingdom was tailored to
the challenges of globalization and technological development. 172 This report
became known as the "Gowers Review.' 73 Based on the fact that "[i]n today's fast
moving business environment products are regularly launched within short
timescales," the Gowers Review proposed the introduction of a "fast track system"
for trademark applications that would allow marks to be examined and accepted
within ten days of filing, after which the three-month period of public opposition
would begin. 74 In Canada, an expedited registration procedure exists precisely
because "the applicant wants to know if [the mark] could be registered before a
large amount of money is spent on advertising or production costs.""17 As of
170.
Id. The National Association of Patent Practitioners endorsed the creation of
such a "rocket docket" for design applications. The National Association of Patent
Practitioners, Comments on the Changes to Implement the Patent Business Goals; Proposed
Rule Making, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/anpr/a08.htm.
Meanwhile, another group commented that the proposal "may be advantageous to
applicants as well as the public," but the group had some doubts "as to whether the PTO is
capable of carrying out this expedited examination." Section of Intellectual Property Law,
Comments of Section of Intellectual Property Law-American Bar Association to
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Oct. 5, 1998, http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/anpr/aOl.htm.
171.
It is understood that this problem is ultimately more dramatic in the patent
context, not only because the delays are more significant than for trademark registrations,
but also because trademarks at least receive common law protection prior to registration
whereas patents do not. I thank Graeme Dinwoodie for his comments here.
172.
P6ter Mezei, FairUse and Culture: Comments on the Gowers Review, 39 U.
TOL. L. REv. 653, 654 (2008).
173.
Id.
174.
Andrew Gowers, Gowers Review of Intellectual Property, § 5.38 (Nov.
2006), availableat http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr06_gowers-report-755.pdf.
175.
Canadian Intellectual Property Office, Amendments to the Examination
Manual:
Requests
for
Expedited
Examination
(Feb.
23,
2000),
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/wr00653.html.
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March 2000, however, the Canadian Intellectual Property Office restricted the
procedure for requesting expedited processing, making it more difficult to
obtain.176 The Office justified its decision to restrict the procedure by explaining
that "[t]he advancement of an application out' 77of routine order creates a favored
position at the expense of all other applicants."'
Indeed, as long as all registrations are performed by one government
entity, expedited review for one applicant comes at the expense of other applicants.
This would remain the case unless a near-infinite amount of resources were
invested in the process. If, however, the registration process was opened to private
actors, the pressure on any given registrar would be diminished. If a registrar's
resources could no longer satisfy applicants, applicants could fird a different
registrar. Not only would private entities provide a more reliable chance at a
speedy outcome, but prices would likely drop from where they currently stand, i.e.,
in the hundreds of dollars. 178 This would alleviate concerns about economic
disparities between applicants, 79 and would allow individuals who currently opt
for state registration due to the cost of federal registration to obtain the latter.
Some trademark applicants might even be willing to accept a slower registration
process in exchange for lower fees. 80 Further, registrars could set different prices
and processing times for applications that vary in type and complexity, for instance
distinguishing between more traditional trademarks that consist of graphic
materials as opposed to those that consist of sounds. One could envision a system
where a registrar charges based on an estimate of how many work hours different
applications will require. Private registrars are therefore likely to allow for a
multitude of possibilities in this area. The PTO is simply unable to match the
reduced prices and variety of options that private registrars could offer.
176.
Id.
177.
Id. One organization criticized the aforementioned creation of a design patent
"rocket docket" for the same reason, i.e., that such a system would "have a tendency to
delay action of other applications as the prosperous applicants rush to the front of the
examination que[ue]." American Intellectual Property Law Association, Re: AIPLA
Comments on the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Entitled "Changes to
Implement the Patent Business Goals," (Dec. 4, 1998), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices
/pac/dapp/opla/comments/anpr/a02.htm; see also The New York Intellectual Property Law
Association, Inc., Comments on Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Concerning 21
Topics to Implement the Patent Business Goals, (Nov. 30, 1999), http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/comments/anpr/aO9.htm (similarly arguing that the expedited
procedure for design applications would create delays for applicants who lack "deep
pockets").
178.
See supranote 10 and accompanying text.
179.
Of course, applicants with greater financial means could afford a faster
process. That being said, they would not do so at the expense of other applicants, and all
applicants-no matter what their economic background-would likely obtain speedier
registrations than they do today. It is also important to note that faster registration would not
result in increased substantive rights if there is a race for registering a particular mark; the
decisive factor in such races is the date that an application is filed, not the date when a mark
is actually registered.
180.
The internet domain-name area has seen a great variety of services spring up
that are customized to consumers' needs and come with a corresponding diversity of price
tags.
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C. Quality-Enforcement Mechanisms
One of the greatest concerns of privatization opponents is that private
registrars could register marks indiscriminately to accrue rapid financial gain,
without regard for the conditions of the Lanham Act or as to whether a mark is
infringing. Two types of quality-enforcement mechanisms can minimize this type
of problem. The first consists of governmental safeguards, and the second-which
will likely become the key mechanism--consists of market protections.
Governmental safeguards must not stifle competition in their strictness
but must still eliminate blatant abuse. One possibility would be for the government
to record data about the percentage of registrations issued by each individual
registrar that receive public opposition and/or are later struck down by courts.
While this might prove useful in some cases, it could admittedly take a long time
to uncover a registrar's widespread abuse in this way. Some registrars could also
try to game the system by allowing a number of marks that either violate the
Lanham Act or infringe against another mark but that are unlikely to provoke
much opposition or litigation.1 81 A registrar would have to expend a substantial
amount of resources, however, to calculate which improper registrations would be
likely to cause trouble and which would not, possibly to the point of making the
selective registration of improper marks a nonlucrative endeavor. Furthermore,
even if some improper registrations occur in this context, their number would
likely remain small, and it is unclear that they would have a major impact on the
system.
Another government safeguard would be random PTO audits of
registrations. Individuals in the public or the PTO itself could initiate such audits if
they saw suspicious activity. If the PTO found an inordinate number of improper
registrations,' 82 the registrar in question could lose his or her license and face legal
sanctions such as large fines.' 83 It would also be possible to implement a system
where registrars have the option to forward particularly complex or unclear
applications to the PTO in case of doubt. The vast majority of applications are
unlikely to require any such extra help, and a relatively small number of PTO
attorneys could handle these types of supervisory or assistance-oriented functions.
Private quality-enforcement mechanisms would likely assume a much
more dominant function than government-driven ones. These private mechanisms
fall into both formal and informal categories. In the formal realm, registrars could
provide guarantees by offering liability insurance. That is, a registrar could
communicate to trademark applicants that if they lose their marks through
181.
I would like to thank Eugene Volokh for his observations on this subject.
182.
One could envision different ways to define "improper" in this context and
regulate accordingly. Some relevant factors in making that determination would be to
evaluate the number of marks that a registrar approved and courts held to be invalid or
infringing, but also a significant number of marks that-while never challenged-clearly
fall outside of what any reasonable reading of the Lanham Act would allow. I am grateful to
Justin Hughes and Lisa Ramsey for their comments here.
183.
These fines could cover the costs of the PTO-monitoring procedures.
Further, entities could be asked to pay a fee when becoming approved registrars to cover
any remaining costs.
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cancellation or owe damages for trademark infringement down the line, the
registrar will pay them a certain sum of money or percentage of damages.
Alternatively, registrars could contribute to the legal costs associated with the
defense of marks. Some companies both in the United States 184 and abroad 185 offer
several types of insurance for various forms of intellectual property, and registrars
could use these companies' procedures as a model.186
Title-insurance firms provide another helpful analogy. When an
individual purchases land, she can hire a title-insurance company that will perform
a title search to ensure that no unknown entities hold legally cognizable interests in
the land. Should the insurance company later prove to have been incorrect, it
compensates the land buyer for any losses. Similarly, in the case of trademark
registrars, registrars would perform trademark searches, award marks, and
indemnify trademark owners for losses incurred as a result of an improper
search. 187 Understandably, searches in the trademark context may not be as
ironclad as those in the land-title context, but that fact can be considered when
calculating insurance premiums.
Perhaps the most important measure for ensuring the high quality of
registrations would be the implementation of private quality-enforcement
mechanisms that use word-of-mouth or gossip. The importance of such
mechanisms has been previously examined in legal scholarship, and gossip has
been found to play a profound role as either a replacement or supplementation to
governmental law enforcement in areas such as the now-famous disputes between
ranchers and farmers in Shasta County1 8 8 and the resolution of agreement breaches
in the diamond industry. 189 The reputational damages that result from negative
184.
See, e.g., Intellectual Property Insurance Services Corporation, How Does It
Work?, http://www.ipisc.com/products/insurance-policies/how-does-it-work/ (last visited
Aug. 3, 2008).
185.
See, e.g., Professional Insurance Agents Ltd, What Is Intellectual Property
Insurance,
http://www.intellectualpropertyinsurance.co.uk/what-is-intellectualpropertyinsurance/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2008).
186.
The assumption is that applicants could use a different registrar for a
trademark renewal than the initial application, and so the government or insurance policies
would have to clarify which registrar is liable in each case. One possibility would be to have
liability attach to the last registrar who reviewed a particular mark (i.e., the registrar who
performed the most recent renewal would be liable in the case of litigation).
187.
For a more detailed overview of title insurance, see, for example, Charles
Nyce & M. Martin Boyer, An Analysis of the Title Insurance Industry, available at
http://neumann.hec.ca/gestiondesrisques/98-14.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). I would like
to thank Richard Epstein for suggesting the parallel to title insurance.
188.

ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE

DIsPUTEs (1991); Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among
Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1986). Rather than resorting to
litigation, cattle farmers would often use self-help measures including community gossip to
enforce norm violations. See id. at 677-85.
189.
Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the DiamondIndustry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992). The diamond trade relies
greatly on extralegal contracts whose "enforcement depends on social ostracism or
reputational damage." Id. at 133. Another related example that Lisa Bernstein has discussed
is the use of gossip in the cotton industry, which greatly relies on internal mechanisms to
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gossip can extend to both the social and the economic realm, but the latter is the
focus of private trademark registration.
When customers "are cheaply and accurately informed about the quality
of [a] product, reputation can function as a perfect enforcer of representations as to
that quality."' 9 ° Simply put, when it comes to trademark registration, applicants
will choose the best possible combination of speed, low cost, and reliability if
given a choice between different registrars. The most valuable information about
these variables is likely to come from other applicants. Since the advent of the
internet, gossip has become a powerful tool outside of small, tightly knit
communities, 191 and individuals are able to communicate about the quality of
products or services all over the country and worldwide. One scholar has described
a number of internet mechanisms that promote better quality of products and
services; he discusses both websites that incorporate ratings-such as eBay's
feedback system in which one can rate sellers and buyers-and sites whose entire
purpose is the rating of businesses, such as Epinions.com.' 92 While these feedback
systems are bound to be imperfect in some respects, "because most feedback
providers are sincere, and algorithms can help the purveyors or users of these sites
weigh more heavily the feedback provided by reviewers who
have proven their
19 3
reliability, their signal-to-noise ratios are often quite high.,
A system of private trademark registrars would greatly benefit from a
similar mechanism. Early on, the PTO could implement a rating system through its
website, but this would probably not be necessary down the line. An ideal system
would allow trademark applicants to rate registrars at several stages. First,
applicants should be able to give ratings after the completion of registration so that
applicants could comment on the speed, price/quality relationship, competence of
the examiners, and so on. Then, applicants (now mark owners) should have the
opportunity about every five years to leave further feedback. This way, they could
communicate to other potential applicants whether anyone sued them for4
19
trademark infringement and if the legal system held their marks to be invalid.
perform. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions,99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001).
190.
David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 373, 413 (1990).
191.
See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: Gossip,
RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET (2007) (discussing the changes in societal views

and impact on reputation created by the advent of the internet); Eric Goldman, Online Word
of Mouth and Its Implicationsfor Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A
HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 404,411-13 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D.

Janis eds., 2008) (explaining how the internet has amplified the effect of word of mouth).
192.
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous
PersonalInformation, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1667 (2008).
193.
Id. at 1716. Some of these measures could perhaps also thwart some
applicants' attempts to excessively reward with positive feedback any registrars who give
out impermissibly broad trademark rights. One could also envision a secondary market for
companies that would engage in independently rating registrars.
194.
To ensure sufficient and representative amounts of feedback, leaving
feedback could be a mandatory part of the process to obtain one's final registration and

renewals.
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Applicants whose marks were rejected from the start during registration
proceedings should perhaps not have access to the feedback system (or their
comments should be designated as coming from rejected applicants). Otherwise,
there is a risk that such applicants would simply seek to exact revenge on registrars
who legitimately turned down marks.1 95 The eBay site changed its feedback
system after it became clear that many sellers were leaving negative feedback
against complaining buyers as a tit-for-tat measure. 196 Applicants could become
angry over rejections and leave unfair criticism that could damage scrupulous
registrars, which would make the ratings unreliable and defeat their purpose.
Of course, this cannot work on its own in the beginning, when few
people, or none, will have used a particular registrar. As one scholar has pointed
out, "expulsion [from the marketplace] may not deter the manufacturer from
breaching when the manufacturer earns a net profit from sales before reputation is
devalued. ' '197 In some cases, informal mechanisms will still remain sufficient if
"the specific investment required of the firm to enter the market-its dedication of
assets whose value would be sacrificed if the firm were later excluded from the
market"-is "so great that the firm suffers a net loss when expelled from the
market, even though the firm sells some defective products before the market
discovers the defect."' 98 It is conceivable that for many registrars, it is not worth
trying to make a quick buck because as soon as the feedback system begins
retaliating, much of the registrar's initial investment could be lost.
Governmental and private formal quality-enforcement mechanisms can
play a key role in containing misbehavior early in the life of a registrar. They
ensure a minimum standard, which is particularly relevant in the beginning, and
down the line the private informal mechanism can signal finer gradations to
potential clients. Of course, in addition to all these measures, regular contract and
fraud laws would apply and would restrain the behavior of any registrars who
remained undeterred by the other mechanisms.1 99

195.
See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, "How's M* Driving?" for Everyone (and
Everything?), 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1699, 1714 (2006) (explaining that a desire for revenge
often motivates participants in "how is my driving" feedback programs).
196.
See, e.g., Marketplace, eBay Changes Its Feedback Rules (May 19, 2008),
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2008/05/19/ebay feedback.
197.
Chamy, supra note 190.
198.
Id.
199.
For a general discussion of accountability mechanisms in the privatization
context, see Dannin, supra note 87, at 147-51.
It is understood that a number of questions remain to be resolved before the
implementation of a proposal like the one delineated here. For instance, would private
registrars also be responsible for applications to the Supplemental Register and for ITU
applications? The intuitive answer appears to be yes, but these are subjects deserving of
further study. Also, how would this model function with the Madrid Protocol for the
International Registration of Marks? There is no obvious conflict between the partial
privatization proposed here and the international agreements governing intellectual
property. Further work is needed to establish the best way to optimize the functioning of
this model in the international context, and the idea of privatized system that spans several
countries is potentially conceivable as well.
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These new features could ultimately provide a much more robust
safeguard against poor quality of registration than those existing in the current
system. As one scholar points out, governmental trademark bureaucracies
20 0
themselves have incentives to choose not to scrutinize applications thoroughly.
"[T]he drive to measure performance by reference to clearly identifiable and
quantifiable outputs means that things like increases in the number of applications
and renewals and decreases in the amount of time it takes to process applications
will always be treated as evidence of success., 20 1 While it is useful to keep track of
processing time due to the difficulties inherent in delays, as this Article suggests,
this should not come at a significant expense to application quality. The safeguards
proposed here stem from recognizing and addressing the problem that registrarsbe they public or private--can have reasons to provide "quick and dirty"
processing. Thanks to the introduction of these safeguards, and due to the fact that
private companies are not the only ones to suffer from potentially harmful
incentives, it is conceivable that quality of registration will actually go up through
the model proposed here. Even if the harmful incentives turn out to be stronger in
the private sector because companies may want to show more responsiveness to
applicants than the government does, the safeguards would ensure that quality of
registration would at least remain about the same. The issue of quality is further
addressed in the next Subsection.
D. Possible Objections to the Model and Responses
As with any new legal model, a number of potential objections to this
model exist. This Section will attempt to address three of these arguments and their
relevant points.
The first concern is that some registrars could recklessly register random
marks, with complete disregard for Lanham Act guidelines, in hopes of making
short-term gains and then exiting the business. These registrars would exhibit little
concern over negative feedback left by applicants down the line when their marks
get struck down because the registrars would have closed down the business by
then. As a result of poor-quality registrations, there would be a chilling effect on
both other mark applicants and potentially on speech because it would appear as if
certain words (including, for example, impermissibly generic ones) are now
reserved, and not everyone would want to launch full-blown litigation to find out
which marks are legitimate. A few points must be raised in this context. First,
formal measures could be implemented to deter this type of behavior on the part of
registrars through exogenous mechanisms. One way to do so, as mentioned, would
be for the government to impose heavy financial penalties if this occurred. Also,
given that lawyers would be the ones performing the actual registrations, state bar
associations could impose sanctions against them for malpractice or other
unethical behavior, even using disbarment as a deterrent in extreme cases. 02

200.
201.
202.
attorneys but

Burrell, supra note 22, at 35-38 (SSRN pagination).
Id. at 36.
One could imagine an alternative system that does not necessarily use
rather otherwise trained examiners to perform some of this work (which could
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One must examine more closely the assumption that a low number of
poor trademarks would actually have a significant effect on society. If the
government shut down a registrar, the PTO could check its previously registered
marks and weed out any excessive violations of its quality requirements, such as
generic marks. This would likely not occur frequently given that registering risky
trademarks tends to go against the interest of both applicants and registrars.2 °3
Also, even if some "bad" marks were not removed (either because they were not
caught by the PTO or because a registrar was only slightly careless and thus did
not get shut down despite registering some invalid marks), these marks would
probably not survive for long. Individuals and companies who obtain marks for
valuable products are unlikely to want high-risk trademarks because this would
entail the loss of marketing investment and company reputation mentioned
previously in this Article. William Landes and Richard Posner have calculated that
only 27% of trademarks were renewed in the period from 1934 to 1999, and that
the average effective life of a mark was 15.4 years.2° Owners of valuable marks
with heavy investment are seemingly more likely to renew them; conversely, most
unrenewed marks (almost three quarters of all marks) are probably not very
valuable and their owners do not care enough about maintaining exclusivity over
them to file a renewal application. This would likely happen with a substantial
majority of the small number of invalid marks in a privatized system as well, and
any chilling effects would thus likely remain minimal.20 5
The second objection to the model is almost diametrically opposed to the
first objection. It states that a system of private registrars is inferior to a world in
provide further savings, though potentially at some cost to quality), but this would
presumably require larger changes to the rules governing the performance of legal work.
203.
This is not to say that it never happens, including in the current system.
Some actors attempt to obtain illegitimately broad trademark rights to extort money from
competitors. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law,
65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 585 (2008) (arguing that the drop in litigated trademark cases and

simultaneous rise of initial claims stems from an increase in the use of strike suits to deter
market entrants). One notorious case is that of Leo Stoller, an individual who baselessly
sought to extort money by accusing various companies and people of infringing against his
trademarks. See Colin Moynihan, He Says He Owns the Word 'Stealth' (Actually, He
Claims 'Chutzpah,' Too), N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2005, at C5. Stoller's efforts, however, ended

in a rather unfortunate fate for the man: after receiving sanctions from numerous courts
including the PTO's Trademark Trial & Appeal Board and encountering various other
troubles, he had to file for bankruptcy and his assets were sold. See Beth Chapman, Oblon,
Spivak, McClelland, Maier & Neustadt, P.C., Stoller Sanctioned By USPTO's Trademark
Trial & Appeal Board, (July 2006), http://www.oblon.com/media/index.php?id=320; John
L. Welch, Sale of Stoller TrademarkAssets to SPTA is Completed, THE TTABLOG, Aug. 21,
2007, http://thettablog.blogspot.com/2007/08/sale-of-stoller-trademark-assets-to.html.
204.
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 514 (2003).

205.
I thank Jonathan Barnett for the helpful conversation we had on this subject.
Of course, this presents a major difference between the privatization of a government
activity like trademark registration and functions related to areas such as public health or
national security. This is no judgment about the feasibility of privatization in such areas but
rather an assessment that the privatization proposal here presents relatively low risks,
especially if implemented through a slow and careful transition.
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which we eliminate the registration system altogether. The idea would be to
maintain solely a federal database of marks (privately or publicly run) where mark
holders could give notice of their use or intent to use of particular marks. This
would eliminate all the costs associated with a registration system and would leave
the court system to handle any conflicts between mark users. The presumption of
validity that marks possess in litigation would, of course, also disappear given that
nobody would be checking database entries. While attractive in its apparent
simplicity, such a setup would suffer from a significant number of problems. For
one, litigation is expensive. If there is no gatekeeper function for the database, the
database is likely to be flooded with entries. This would result in a massive amount
of litigation that would soon clog up the courts. There is also nothing to stop
database users from engaging in various forms of trademark-hoarding, meaning
that individuals who are not actually using or intending to use certain marks would
put them into the database in the hope of turning a fraction of those terms into
sellable goods. At that point, there really would be large chilling effects against
competitors20 6 and possibly free speech.20 7
This would also necessitate a reevaluation of virtually all of trademark
law because federal registration currently comes with particular benefits in
addition to giving constructive notice of use and priority, 208 which is all the
database would achieve in the best-case scenario. As discussed in the
Introduction, 20 9 federal registration allows a mark to become incontestable five
years after registration,21 ° permits a mark owner to rely on the assistance of
customs officials to prevent importation of infringing marks, 211 and increases the
number of remedies available to an owner.212 Dismissing all of these measures by
introducing a notice-only database would deal
a huge blow to brand owners'
213
investments and ability to rely on their marks.

206.
Mark Lemley discusses these so-called "in terrorem" effects in the patent
context, i.e., the fear that a potential competitor would be afraid to enter a field because of a
pre-existing patent. Lemley, supra note 23, at 1516. He does not believe this to be a
problem for patents because innovators do not tend to perform patent database searches
before they innovate. Id.This is a much larger problem for trademarks, where companies
often do search the trademark databases before choosing brand names and would thus be
affected more by false entries.
207.
For a discussion of the relationship between trademarks and free speech, see
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 397 (1990).
208.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(c), 1072 (2006).
209.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
210.
15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2006).
211.
Id.§ 1124.
212.
Id.§§ 1116-1120.
213.
I am grateful to Mark Lemley and Eric Goldman for the conversation we had
on this subject. Of course, the Supplemental Register that the PTO operates is in effect a
notice-only register, but it serves very specific purposes and trademark owners often use it
to obtain more reliable benefits such as eventual regular registration in the United States or
other countries. Leaving one's mark on the Supplemental Register alone comes with a
number of disadvantages, such as "[b]ecause registration on the Supplemental Register
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Further complication comes from the fact that a notice-only system leaves
great uncertainty when it comes to licensing. Trademark registrations, while
imperfect, provide information about whether an individual wishing to use a mark
needs to request a license from an existing owner. One scholar suggested that
"trademark users often seek a license when none is needed" as it is, and that this
occurs because they "do not want to take their chances with trademark's
indeterminate doctrines and supracompensatory remedies. 214 This problem would
be much compounded if we renounced the registration system altogether. Due to
all these concerns, it is highly unlikely that a notice-only system would function
well, and in any case it would suffer from numerous drawbacks when compared to
the model presented here.215
The European Union's system of community trademarks (CTMs), which
covers all countries in the European Union through a single application, effectively
provides a middle way between U.S.-style registration and notice-only models.
While the administrator of the system, the Office for Harmonization in the Internal
Market (OHIM), examines whether marks meet certain characteristics as to
distinctiveness and so on, OHIM does not verify whether a mark may conflict with
marks already in existence. 216 The first opportunity for the resolution of a conflict
is during opposition
proceedings that the owner of the allegedly pre-existing right
217
has to initiate.
The functioning of trademark law outside the United States is
mostly outside the scope of this Article, but a few words about CTMs are apposite.
The system proved very popular, and the number of applications that OHIM
received doubled from 1996, when the system was created, to 2007 (from 43,135
to 88,251 applications in a year).218 A large percentage of applications, howeverabout 20%-have been opposed in that time period, which "has caused significant
delays. As of January 1, 2008, approximately 642,170 applications were pending
at OHIM. 219 OHIM has further been plagued by a number of other problems, such
implies that secondary meaning cannot be shown, a prior user can cancel a Supplemental
Registration." MCCARTHY, supra note 7, at § 19:37.
214.
James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 907 (2007).
215.
At least one scholar has actually even suggested the creation of a registration
system for famous trademarks in addition to the existing general registration procedure. See
Lars S. Smith, Implementing a Registration System for Famous Trademarks, 93
TRADEMARK REP. 1097 (2003). It is worth noting that the calculus may look different in the
patent context, where several scholars have raised serious arguments in favor of moving to a
more cost-effective "soft-look" system of registration that would focus on resolving
disputes through litigation rather than providing significant scrutiny through ex-ante
examination. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, The Case for RegisteringPatents and the Law and
Economics of PresentPatent-ObtainingRules, 45 B.C. L. REv. 55 (2003); Lemley, supra
note 23, at 1526-27. Patent applications, however, require much more intensive inquiry
than trademark ones, and thus a greater move toward litigation could easily proportionally
raise costs more in the trademark than patent system.
216.
See, e.g., Vincent O'Reilly, The Community Trademark System: A Brief
Introduction and Review, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 93, 105-06 (2004).
217.
See id.
at 106.
218.
See Paul W. Reidl, Understanding Basic Trademark Law: A Primer on
Global TrademarkProtection,939 PLIIPAT 205, 234 (2008).
219.
Id.
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as when the entire OHIM Staff Committee resigned in protest in 2004 over a
number of issues in the workplace, including that the target for examining marks
was cut from eleven to six minutes. 220 Additionally, as of mid-March 2009, the
CTM online database was apparently close to a month out of date due to disruption
caused by the installation of new software, a situation met with particular criticism
because applicants were "struggling to trade efficiently" in the midst of an
economic recession.2 21 While the subject deserves more extensive study, these
issues do not inspire confidence that the CTM system,
222 at least in its current
implementation, is preferable to the one presented here.
A third objection about the private-registrar model is the possibility that
while the model does not formally change the substantive requirements of the
Lanham Act with regard to the conditions that marks need to fulfill, registrars will
soon begin lobbying for harmful changes to the Act. These lobbying efforts would
seek to allow registrars to register a greater variety of marks and earn increased
income, This is unlikely because, when it comes to picking a mark, an applicant
who cannot choose one mark is likely to create another. Thus, it is unclear thatassuming one preserves the use requirement-such changes to the Lanham Act
would result in a net increase of marks and thus registrar revenues.
Additionally, if the prison-privatization debate is any indication,
increased lobbying from private actors in these types of frameworks is unlikely to
significantly distort the law. 223 In the prison context, the standard argument is that
private prisons will lobby for higher incarceration rates to increase their business
opportunities.2 24 As one scholar argues, however, any lobbying from the private
sector is negligible compared to the pre-existing lobbying on the part of public
employees performing the same type of work; he explains that a reduction in
lobbying is often possible because breaking up the government's monopoly can
introduce a collective-action problem within an industry. 225 In light of both the

220.
See IPKat, OHIM Staff Committee Resigns, Or How to Run the Six-Minute
Mile (Apr. 29, 2004), http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2004/04/ohim-staff-committee-resignsor-how-to.html.
221.
IPKat, OHIM System Delays: The World Waits (Mar. 19, 2009),
http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2009/03/ohim-system-delays-world-waits.html.
222.
This being said, the CTM system does possess a number of assets (such as
potentially greater stability and predictability than existed previously) and ultimately OHIM
does not have a monopoly over trademark registration in Europe, which is one of several
differences between that system and PTO registration in the United States. I thank Graeme
Dinwoodie, Spyros Maniatis, and Jeremy Phillips for the discussions we had on this topic.
223.
Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political
Advocacy, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1197 (2008).
224.
See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and PrivatePrisons, 55 DUKE
L.J. 437, 542-43 (2005) (arguing that "the state ought not to foster yet another potentially
influential industry that could seek to compromise further the possibility of legitimate
punishment to promote that industry's own financial interests").

225.

Volokh, supra note 223, at 1203-04. In the prison context, "[t]he public-

sector unions will spend less because under privatization they experience less of the benefit
of their advocacy, while the private firms will tend to free ride off the public sector's

advocacy." Id. at 1204. Of course, there are likely some differences between public
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nature of the trademark system and the mixed arguments when it comes to
likelihood of lobbying in privatization contexts, there is little evidence to show that
the risk from substantive and negative changes to the Lanham Act through
privatization-related lobbying is a serious concern.
E. Other Application Areas for the Private Registrar Model
A number of other administrative processes could potentially benefit from
great improvement with the help of the model presented here. For one, if the model
proves successful, it could also apply to the patent arena. 26 The advantage of first
implementing this idea for trademark registration is that it is an area of more
diminished legal and technical complexity than patent registration; thus, it may
prove simpler to find a significant number of competent entrepreneurs that could
perform trademark as opposed to patent registration at least as well as the PTO. If
the privatized trademark registration system succeeds as expected, one could study
the matter more extensively and make adjustments to the model as needed before
adapting it to the patent context.
Lawrence Lessig has also suggested that copyright law could benefit from
a more formalized system of registration. Analogizing to the private system of
domain-name registration, he explained:
The Copyright Office may well serve as the central registry, but it
should not be in the registrar business. Instead, it should establish a
database, and a set of standards for registrars. It should approve
registrars that meet its standards. Those registrars would then
compete with one another to deliver the cheapest and simplest
systems for registering and renewing copyrights. That competition
would substantially lower the burden of this formality-while
producing a database
227 of registrations that would facilitate the
licensing of content.
The discussion of whether copyrights should be registered differently
than they do today goes beyond the scope of this Article,228 but the conclusions
drawn here support Lessig's contention that any such copyright registration system
would gain from the use of private competing registrars.
employees in the intellectual-property context and those in the prison context, but a number
of public employees in both worlds presumably prefer a world without privatization.
226.
John Duffy and Michael Abramowicz at George Washington University Law
School are currently working on a proposal to use private actors in the patent registration
arena.
227.
LESSIG, supra note 31, at 289-90. Christopher Sprigman provides a more indepth treatment of the idea that copyright law would benefit from an increased number of
formalities. Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REv. 485
(2004).
228.
For a more extensive discussion of copyright registration, see, for example,
Douglas Y'Barbo, On Section 411 of the Copyright Code and Determining the Proper
Scope of a Copyright Registration, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 343 (1997); Mose Bracey, Note,
Searchingfor Substance in the Midst of Formality: Copyright Registration as a Condition

Precedent to the Exercise of Subject-MatterJurisdictionby FederalCourts over Copyright
Infringement Claims, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 111 (2006).
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Conceivably, a similar model could benefit a number of other
administrative areas that currently involve government monopolies, be they at the
federal or state level. The private trademark registration model may also teach
lessons as to the decision to privatize (or not) in areas such as driver's licenses,
liquor licenses, health inspections, and any number of other areas that require
decisions regarding licensing or certification. These areas often involve questions
as to safety or specific effectiveness determinations, however, and require much
further study in that regard. Many of the same criteria used in this Article to find
the best possible model would apply in these other fields as well, and there would
especially be a need for the creation of a competitive market and ways to establish
monitoring mechanisms. In addition to the more traditional means of various forms
of government regulation, one of the rather unique features of this proposal-the
eBay-style feedback mechanism that would provide not only short-term but also
long-term information about registrars and mark quality--could prove to be a
valuable tool in these other contexts. The combination of public and private
safeguards proposed here could thus provide a type of safety net that would allow
for privatization in spheres outside intellectual property where that possibility has
remained unexplored.
CONCLUSION
The current system of trademark registration is problematic in ways that
are unlikely to change as long as the procedure remains in the hands of the
government. This Article has shown how a paradigm shift could allow for
innovation and subsequent improvement in the areas of speed and pricing without
sacrificing quality. The combination of private registrars, flexible pricing, and
public as well as private quality-enforcement mechanisms holds great promise for
the future in an area where there is much hand-wringing and few proposed
solutions.
One can expect a large number of businesses and individuals in need of
effective trademark registration services to support this model and help to promote
its passage in the political process once a centralized proposal is actually on the
table.229 Of course, opposition will follow, both from members of the PTO
comfortable with their current roles and from individuals who fundamentally
disagree with all or most privatization proposals. Many of the features presented
here can be tweaked and should be considered as a jumping board for the
development of a full-fledged legislative proposal. There is reason to be confident,
however, that entrepreneurial groups will respond if given the chance to compete
and optimize registration procedures. Hopefully some current PTO trademark
examiners will use their know-how and be amongst those that contribute to this
project. Whether that turns out to be the case or not, a significant percentage of
firms that currently perform trademark searches for clients and advise them in their
applications will likely step up to the plate. This process will not happen from one
day to the next, and it may in fact be preferable to gradually shift from public to
private registrations, beginning with volunteer applicants the way that the peer-to229.
It appears intuitively easier for scattered individuals and groups to gather
around an existing proposal than to rally and lobby at the initial stage.
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patent model did or through a pilot contract with one to two companies (awarded
through bidding) to take over a certain percentage of existing applications. In any
case, it will be exciting to watch the response of the first pioneers in the new land
of private trademark registration.

